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As Chinese investment in South America has grown exponentially and influenced 
the region, has South America benefited from the investment? This paper features case 
studies of both Venezuela and Argentina to illustrate how Chinese investment has had 
different effects on these two economies. Venezuela has relied heavily on loans-for-oil to 
fuel its socialist economy and feed its political structure, resulting in very negative 
outcomes. On the other hand, Argentina has channeled Chinese investment mostly into 
infrastructure, such as energy diversification projects, with the construction of two 
hydroelectric dams, two nuclear reactors, and upgrades to its outdated railway systems. 
Chinese investment can boost South American economies if it is used for infrastructure 
that will lead to less reliance on additional Chinese loans. Unfortunately, both countries 
rely heavily on raw material exports and need to ensure that manufacturing and technology-
based jobs are not lost in the process. As China gains more influence in the region, the 
United States needs to provide alternate sources of investment and bring to light the pitfalls 
created by the current Sino-South America partnership. 
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A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis answers the question, “Are South American countries benefiting from 
Chinese investment?” 
Import substitution industrialization (ISI) was attempted in South America in the 
1950s by imposing high tariffs on imports to shield its infant industries, in order to 
eventually compete with the core’s manufacturing capabilities and costs. Argentina’s own 
economist Raul Prebisch taught Dependency Theory or how the core or technologically 
advanced economies, like the United States, used the peripheral countries to further 
perpetuate the core’s progress. This, in turn, would create a richer center and leave the 
periphery poorer and enslaved to the core. However, only the larger Latin American 
economies had success with ISI because their economies created enough demand to make 
a profit from a large enough quantity of highly inefficient domestically manufactured 
products. Smaller countries incurred larger losses due to inefficiencies and lower demand 
for the products.  
In the 1980s, the World Bank aided Latin American economies that had not 
sufficiently benefitted from ISI. Along with the financial assistance came strings attached 
to implement the neoliberal reforms that the banks demanded in return. After several 
decades of following orders from the United States, enduring years of U.S. military 
intervention, suffering from oppressive loans, and tolerating unfair foreign business 
practices, South American countries once again sought their own sovereignty, political 
autonomy, and economic independence.  
According to Robert Ellis, these occurrences motivated left-leaning governments 
in South American countries to seek more flexible investment options to fund their projects 
and programs on their own terms instead of following the dictates of U.S.-backed 
organizations (e.g., World Development Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), or 
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Washington’s policies).1 China’s increased involvement in South America matters greatly, 
because if it succeeds at displacing the United States politically and economically, there 
will likely occur significant changes throughout the Western Hemisphere that diminish 
U.S. power globally. 
South America has met China’s requests for strategic partnerships by providing 
China commodities as well as export and foreign investment opportunities. According to 
Stephen Kaplan, Chinese loans—and subsequent investment—have increased dramatically 
since the 2008 financial crisis and have supplied South America with “patient capital” as 
opposed to short-term capital with associated restraints, enabling South America to 
sidestep U.S. political-economic maneuvers in the region.2 Consequently, as noted by 
Harold Trinkunas, Chinese foreign investment in Latin America surpassed that of such 
traditional sources as the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank in 2013.3  
Furthermore, Trinkunas notes that Chinese trade with South American countries 
has risen significantly, and in many South American countries, it has surpassed levels of 
trade with the United States.4 As of 2012, observe Wu Baiyi and Liu Weiguang, some of 
South America’s most successful and influential countries, Brazil and Chile, were among 
those that now conduct more trade with China than the United States.5 These examples of 
rising trade, foreign investment, and cooperation indicate how China and South America 
both appear to be achieving economic gain while the United States is losing ground. 
China’s aggressive engagement in global banking—at a time when many South 
American leaders sought alternative financing—enabled it to gain access to South 
                                                 
1 Robert Evan Ellis, China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores, vol. 46 (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2009), 26. 
2 Stephen B. Kaplan, “Banking Unconditionally: The Political Economy of Chinese Finance in Latin 
America,” Review of International Political Economy 23, no. 4 (July 3, 2016): 2. 
3 Harold Trinkunas, “Renminbi Diplomacy? The Limits of China’s Influence on Latin America’s 
Domestic Politics,” Foreign Policy at Brookings, Geoeconomics and Global Issues, no. 3 (November 
2016): 1. 
4 Trinkunas, 5. 
5 Liu Weiguang Wu Baiyi, China-Latin America Relations: Review and Analysis (Reading: Paths 
International, 2012), 98. 
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America’s raw materials and energy markets. Andrew Cooper and Jorge Heine claim that 
Chinese planners understood China’s industrial growth had surpassed its domestic energy 
and resource production capacity, and that there was an insufficient amount of natural 
resources and agricultural production in Southeast Asia to maintain its economy and 
citizenry.6 This “win-win” financing seems to drive South America’s political economy 
while supplying China the energy and materials needed to feed its domestic industries, 
resulting in an arrangement that is complementary rather than competitive. 
This chapter focuses on the available literature available about Chinese investment 
in South America and whether it has benefited South America. This is important because 
if South America is benefiting, it is critical that the United States implement policies that 
will help it regain the regional title of “partner of choice.” Next, potential hypotheses are 
discussed to understand whether Chinese investment has been beneficial to South America 
or not. Finally, the research design describes the thesis’ approach of analyzing Chinese 
investment in South America to better understand the dynamics of the new form of global 
banking and to determine if it is benefitting South America. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review focuses on how South America has sought autonomy from 
the grasp of Washington, benefited from the autonomy, and how South America may be 
negatively affected. Finally, China’s interests in South America are also reviewed to 
portray how the two have joined together financially to minimize U.S. influence. 
1. South America’s Pursuit of Fiscal and Political Autonomy from 
United States 
Due to the perception that U.S. policies are unfriendly to Latin American interests, 
12 countries from the region formed in 2008 the Union of South American Nations 
(UNASUR) to begin cutting ties with the U.S. “core.” As Jeanne Hey states, “an anti-core 
policy is . . . the ‘new’ Latin American Foreign Policy. It is oriented towards the Third 
                                                 
6 Andrew Fenton Cooper and Jorge Heine, Which Way Latin America?: Hemispheric Politics Meets 
Globalization (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2009), 102. 
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World, promotes the New International Economic Order (NIEO), and seeks autonomy 
from the U.S.A.”7 Because the United States has been the core, it has used “carrot and 
stick” approaches for several decades, South American countries have looked to other 
trading partners to achieve political-economic goals. This further aligns with the view of 
Hey, who states, “economically dependent states will develop policies that accord with 
their patrons’ foreign-policy wishes.”8 South American leaders have not always agreed 
with U.S. foreign policy and therefore understand the need to disconnect economically to 
achieve political autonomy. By finding other countries to provide the same economic 
benefits without strings attached, South America can more easily implement policies that 
may counter U.S. interests.  
For example, Baiyi et al. suggest that Latin America and China were insulated from 
the 2008 financial crisis due to fewer financial and market linkages with the United States.9 
On the other hand, Kaplan argues that it was the increase of Chinese loans to South 
America—patient capital—that helped those countries weather the storm.10 Less 
researched is how Chinese investment: 
• Helps prop up non-democratic, South America regimes over the long run  
• Provides measures to counter U.S. policies 
• Creates less transparency both financially and politically 
Additional research by Ellis also suggests that because of fewer strings attached to 
Chinese loans, there is hope for growth in commodity exports to China and China’s also 
acting as a counterweight to offset U.S. influence in the region.11 Similarly, Ernesto 
                                                 
7 Jeanne A. K. Hey, “Three Building Blocks of a Theory of Latin American Foreign Policy,” Third 
World Quarterly 18, no. 4 (September 1, 1997): 637. 
8 Hey, 637. 
9 Wu Baiyi, China-Latin America Relations: Review and Analysis, 97. 
10 Kaplan, “Banking Unconditionally: The Political Economy of Chinese Finance in Latin America,” 
17. 
11 Ellis, China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores, 46:24. 
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Vivares suggests, “Washington no longer determines the equilibrium of world power in a 
decisive way as it did after the Cold War. There are new and influential players to take 
account of.”12 On the other hand, Hey states that pro-core policies are often implemented 
when a country depends on the core for monetary reasons, political unrest, or simply the 
prestige of being associated with the core (e.g., the U.S. government, World Bank, or 
IMF).13 Because China has offered more loans-for-resources, China has altered the 
composition of the traditional core and has altered the structure of diplomatic ties in the 
Western Hemisphere, thus reducing the United States’ traditional hegemonic role with 
unforeseen consequences. 
The literature is abundant but conflicting when it comes to South America’s 
benefitting from Chinese investment. “While such a pattern may produce more wealth and 
optimize the allocation of resources globally,” notes Ellis, “it will do so, in part, by 
propagating income inequality and a lack of well-paying jobs throughout Latin America.”14 
It may create short-term benefits for South America while accelerating the spread of 
Chinese geopolitical influence in the Western Hemisphere. How? By providing China 
additional soft power while it continues to grow as a world superpower.  
Additionally, Kevin Gallagher states that increasing commodity exports to China 
has caused currency appreciation, which, if countries are not careful, can destroy domestic 
industry and employment by suppressing investment in noncommodity industries.15 This 
is problematic because the majority of Chinese investment is in the energy sector. 
Furthermore, because Chinese imports have slowed worldwide, South America’s windfall 
revenues will recede, and, if governments have not properly invested in other sectors or 
saved significantly, Chinese investment will have done little for the region. 
                                                 
12 Ernesto Vivares, Exploring the New South American Regionalism (NSAR) (New York: Routledge, 
2016), 50. 
13 Hey, “Three Building Blocks of a Theory of Latin American Foreign Policy,” 634. 
14 Ellis, China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores, 46:287. 
15 Kevin P. Gallagher, The China Triangle: Latin America’s China Boom and the Fate of the 
Washington Consensus (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 92. 
 6 
2. China’s Interests in South American Investment 
China’s economy has grown so quickly that Chinese interests in South America 
have grown substantially in search of opportunities for natural resource imports and 
manufactured exports to South America. Chinese interest has also been enticing to South 
America because of new opportunities for foreign investment other than that with the 
United States. Ellis states that China has four interests in South America: “acquiring 
primary products, obtaining markets for Chinese exports, gaining international isolation of 
Taiwan, and securing strategic alliances as part of China’s global positioning as it emerges 
as a superpower.”16 These four objectives seem to align well with South American 
objectives because: 
1. They dovetail with the Chinese commodity boom. 
2. All South American countries except Paraguay have ceased recognizing 
Taiwan as the Republic of China. 
3. Most have enjoyed the maneuvering room afforded by new forms of 
financing with fewer conditionalities than Bretton Woods institutions 
imposed. 
The Chinese have many political as well as economic reasons for maintaining 
strong Sino-South American ties. Ellis states that China is building strategic partnerships 
with Latin American countries that hold significant power in their regions, such as 
Venezuela in the Caribbean, Mexico in Central America, and Brazil and Argentina in South 
America, which show more geopolitical influence rather than strictly economic reasons.17 
This creates the Chinese counterweight that is needed to combat the undesirable U.S. 
hegemony in all three of these regions.  
Additionally, Kaplan states, “China’s state-led capitalism is an important form of 
patient capital. Unlike the short-term horizon of private market capital, patient capital is 
                                                 
16 Ellis, China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores, 46:9. 
17 Ellis, 46:17. 
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characterized by both a long-term horizon and long-term relationships.”18 This “patient 
capital” as Kaplan calls it, buys South American leaders time to pursue their objectives 
without short-term investors threatening to pull funds on account of uneasiness about 
market trends, political environment, and other events. Furthermore, Kaplan states that 
China is a complementary commodity-trading partner with South America because, unlike 
the United States, China does not need to protect its agricultural products, as the U.S. 
government does through subsidies, therefore creating more cost-effective commodity 
trade for both countries.19 This makes trade much between China and South America much 
easier than the conflict-laden agricultural trade between the United States and South 
America.  
Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged $250 billion in overseas foreign direct 
investment (FDI) to Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) between 2015 and 2019, 
some $50 billion a year, according to David Dollar.20 Although the recipients of these funds 
have not all been determined, it is evident that the Chinese intend to continue investing 
funds in the region. Rolando Avendano, Angel Melguizo, and Sean Miner also suggest that 
Chinese overseas FDI has recently reached $200 billion, shocking many economists 
because Chinese FDI now accounts for 10% of the world’s total FDI, and only a decade 
ago China accounted for just 2%. This outward flow of investment is highly concentrated 
in mergers and acquisitions of “higher value companies with technological knowhow, 
brand value, and strategic assets, such as semiconductor and other advanced 
manufacturers.”21 
                                                 
18 Kaplan, “Banking Unconditionally: The Political Economy of Chinese Finance in Latin America,” 
643. 
19 Kaplan, 5. 
20 David Dollar, “China’s Investment in Latin America” (Brookings, January 2017), 1, 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/fp_201701_china_investment_lat_am.pdf. 
21 Rolando Avendano, Angel Melguizo, and Sean Miner, “Chinese FDI in Latin America: New 
Trends with Global Implications,” The Atlantic Council of the United States and the OECD Development 




The focus of this thesis is to determine whether South America is benefitting from 
Chinese investment because they are relying less on the United States and other western 
sources of capital. What seem to be complementary goals between the China and South 
America will eventually lead to both political and economic non-complementary objectives 
shared by the two regions.  
Chinese foreign investment within South America is a new phenomenon that needs 
to be analyzed for observers to understand how it is shaping South American political-
economic dynamics. Due to China’s influence over Chinese firms and state-owned 
enterprises, South America will likely experience much more pressure from the People’s 
Republic of China as China’s role in the world expands. 
 Additionally, Chinese investment has the ability to prop up regimes that are 
undemocratic and authoritarian. For example, had the Chinese not pumped billions of 
dollars of loans-for-oil investments into Venezuela’s economy to buy Maduro’s regime 
time to implement economic reforms, President Nicolás Maduro might well have been 
forced to step down or been thrown out.  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Chapter II briefly focuses on China’s “opening-up” and “going-out” policies and 
reforms to convey a sense of how the Chinese state-owned banks, under the governance of 
the Communist Party of China, have been able to accomplish what they have in such a 
short time. Additionally, the chapter shows where Chinese global investment has been 
distributed worldwide with an emphasis on growth in South America and why the region 
has embraced a new source of investment.  
Chapters 3 and 4 provide a deeper dive into the political economies of Venezuela 
and Argentina to explore whether and to what degree Chinese investment is helping these 
two countries. Although they are but a small representation of the region, they can speak 
to the practical implications of what other South American countries can expect from 
similar investment by China. The two case studies are extreme in nature, which best 
illustrates how politicians’ decision-making can dramatically affect the outcomes of 
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increased financial ties with China. Venezuela’s economy has become more exposed to the 
resource curse while Argentina has been attempting to diversify its energy sector and 
update infrastructure with the increase in foreign investment instead of using funds for 
political gain through Venezuela’s socialist programs. 
On the other hand, the case studies are limited because no other South American 
countries have oil reserves as large as Venezuela’s and would not likely be able to attain, 
let alone shoulder, the hefty debts that China has allowed Venezuela to incur in exchange 
for oil. In 2015, however, Bolivia relied on oil and gas for nearly 45% of its export revenue 
and an additional 37% from mining and minerals exports.22 This places Bolivia in a highly 
susceptible position to succumb to what its leaders might perceive as attractive loans-for-
resources from China. Similarly, many other economies in the region rely on mining and 
minerals, such as Peru, Colombia, and even Chile, which is one of the strongest economies 
of the region. Furthermore, Ecuador relies on oil for 30% of its exports. These numbers do 
not inherently cause alarm, but coupled with populist leaders, large loans, investment ties, 
and little oversight, they portend the potential for disaster.  
Although not all South American countries have the potential for producing and 
exporting oil, vast amounts of minerals, or such metals as copper and gold, many South 
American countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay can lure China to 
them with their large production of agricultural and animal products. Therefore, they can 
still be susceptible to resource curse, or over-reliance on the revenue from natural resources 
instead of diversifying and developing additional revenue generating sectors. By knowing 
the results of Venezuela and Argentina’s financial decisions, leaders of other South 
American nations can make more informed decisions, leading to more long-term growth, 
and avoid potential pitfalls.  
These comparative case studies collect, measure, and analyze data to determine the 
significance of Chinese influence in South America. In particular, research reviewed 
Chinese investment in Venezuela and Argentina, because China has diversified 
                                                 
22 “By Country Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners,” The Observatory of Economic Complexity, 
accessed January 30, 2018, 
https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/bol/all/show/2015/. 
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investments in hundreds of countries and it is not feasible in this study to analyze each 
South American country. The current crisis in Venezuela makes that nation a particularly 
intriguing case study to understand how China is reacting and possibly foreshadow how 
China will react to the actions of other countries that find themselves in similar situations.  
Argentina, on the other hand, achieved the greatest market growth in the world in 
2017 with a 45% rise in its Mercado de Valores (MERVAL) index, a Buenos Aires stock 
portfolio consisting of 28 large Argentine companies.23 This growth makes Argentina a 
good country to analyze being on the opposite spectrum as Venezuela. Additionally, 
Argentina has a large economy that has gone through cycles of great growth followed by 
great crisis; the country has sought autonomy from the United States since before World 
War II and has been heavily involved with the Chinese in the past decade.  
Finally, Chapter V focuses on U.S. foreign policy recommendations to help steer 
the United States toward being able to furnish attractive alternatives for South American 
countries, and their citizens. For example, in his southern tour to Colombia, Argentina, 
Chile, and Panama in August 2017, Vice President Mike Pence specified, “‘America first’ 
does not mean ‘America alone.’”24 However, the rhetoric alone is not sufficient to gain the 
traction needed to win favor from South American citizens, and new innovative policies 
are necessary for America to remain the “Partner of Choice,” as the 2017 to 2027 U.S. 
Southern Command’s Theater Strategy seeks to achieve. It is imperative that the United 
States use every opportunity to regain its hemispheric hegemony and to preclude China 
from further aligning South America away from U.S. influence as it has during the Chinese 
decade. This thesis considers whether a Good Neighbor policy for the 21st century is likely 
to ensure responsible governance in the Western Hemisphere and to remain the “partner of 
choice” over the rise of China. 
  
                                                 
23 “The Best of 2017 in Business,” Fortune, December 18, 2017, 
http://fortune.com/2017/12/18/business-trends-news-2017/. 
24 Peter McKenna, “Trump’s Abysmal Treatment of Latin America Could Open Up Opportunities for 
Canada,” Chronicle Herald, accessed September 1, 2017, http://thechronicleherald.ca/opinion/1496868-
mckenna-trump%E2%80%99s-abysmal-treatment-of-latin-america-could-open-up-opportunities-for-c. 
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II. CHINA’S “GOING-OUT”: CHANGING GLOBAL INFLUENCE 
IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 
“Ultimate excellence lies not in winning every battle, but in defeating the 
enemy without ever fighting” 
—Sun Tzu 
 
“Let China sleep; when she awakes, she will shake the world.” 
—Napoleon, 1817 
 
“The greatest Chinese dream is the great rejuvenation of the Chinese 
nation.” 
—Xi Jinping, 2012 
 
To better understand how and why China has been able to engage so quickly in 
South America, Chinese domestic and foreign policy—driven by the Communist Party of 
China—need to be understood. This chapter provides the background information needed 
to better understand what is at stake for the Western Hemisphere if China is successful at 
being a superior partner of choice. Chinese economic growth and development abroad 
would not be questioned if investment was highly privatized and detached from heavy 
government influence and power. However, an authoritarian government is at the helm of 
one of the largest economies in the world and it is entangled in financial agreements and 
projects worldwide. This chapter briefly sheds light on China’s opening-up and how its 
reserve accumulation is tied its state-owned bank. Finally, this chapter focuses on China’s 
new “going out” strategy in South America and how South America may be benefiting and 
where it may be losing. 
A. CHINA’S STATE-OWNED “NATIONAL CHAMPIONS” AND THEIR 
WORLDWIDE INFLUENCE 
China began recognizing the inefficiencies of its state-owned enterprise as the 
Asian Tigers continually developed more quickly and were becoming more and more 
advanced despite China’s exhausting labor practices. Once Mao died in 1976, leaders were 
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relieved of his harsh policy of growth at all costs and were given flexibility to try new 
reforms. Watching China’s economy grow, has given hope to some in South America that 
the Chinese model may be more beneficial to their economies than what the Washington 
Consensus has provided them over the past two centuries. 
The Communist Party decided to maintain control over the largest and strategic 
industries permitting the smaller and less significant sectors of industry to either be sold to 
private industry or shut down. These efforts were known as zhuā dà fàng xiǎo, or “grasping 
the large and letting go of the small,” which enabled the party to maintain control over only 
the largest and selective sectors of state-owned enterprises, allowing the smallest state-
owned enterprises to be shut down or privatized to decrease massive inefficiencies. 
According to Nicholas Lardy, to “grasp the big and release the small,” 30 million or two-
fifths of state employees were fired in 1995.25 However, the reform introduced 
privatization, which encouraged vast amounts of inward foreign investment to enter the 
country. Foreign investment boosted China’s domestic industry while decreasing the 
amount of inefficient state run businesses and factories. This reform generated efficiencies 
as foreign companies brought new product ideas to China, enhancing manufacturing 
capabilities, and thus more savings were possible because of higher profit margins of 
private industry and domination of the world markets—leading to the vast foreign 
exchange reserves that China now enjoys.  
Despite China’s state-owned enterprise reform, the state still owns many powerful 
industrial sectors. Lardy states that in 2003, the Chinese government formed the State-
Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission to create “national 
champions” out of state-owned enterprises. Lardy also notes that the Commission would 
oversee 200 of the most important state enterprises and “serve as guarantors of Party 
supremacy.”26 For instance, Lardy’s data from 2009 shows that China’s two largest state-
                                                 
25 Nicholas R. Lardy, Markets Over Mao: The Rise of Private Business in China (Washington, DC: 
Columbia University Press, 2014), 18. 
26 Lardy, 49–50. 
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owned enterprises generated as much profit as the top 500 private Chinese companies 
together.27  
China’s state-owned banks run by the Communist Party provide these “national 
champions” soft-budget loans to invest abroad. An increasing number of these loans, 
however, are non-performing and have created a moral hazard and have continued to cause 
inefficiencies in state-owned enterprises and the state. Lardy highlights other concerns 
about government intervention in business. As he states, “an intimate link between the 
party and these top state-owned firms perhaps is best symbolized by the red phones on the 
desks of these firms’ CEOs, which provide a direct, encrypted link between the firms and 
Zhongnanhai, the location of the Chinese Communist Party headquarters in Beijing.”28 
Furthermore, Carl Walter and Fraser Howie write that in 2010, half of China’s 109 
“national champions” had CEOs embedded by the party.29 These strategic and massive 
state-owned enterprises are directly linked to the interests, influence, and direction of the 
Communist Party of China. 
Although there has been a big change in the name of ownership, those in charge of 
the Communist Party still control the economy. For example, Lardy still believes that while 
the number state-owned enterprises is shrinking, the Communist Party’s aspirations are 
not, and party bosses are willing to tap into its $3.7 trillion reserves to lengthen its control.30 
These reserves create space for the party-state to disregard inefficiencies and instead focus 
on maintaining power, control, and influence.31 This data provides little hope for regime 
change from a single party authoritative system with very deep pockets and power over 
strategic sectors of industry—both domestically and abroad. 
                                                 
27 Lardy, 49. 
28 Lardy, 52. 
29 Carl E. Walter and Fraser J. T. Howie, Red Capitalism: The Fragile Financial Foundation of 
China’s Extraordinary Rise (Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, 2012), 167. 
30 Nicholas R. Lardy, “Book Review Roundtable: Nicholas R. Lardy’s Markets over Mao: The Rise of 
Private Business in China,” Asia Policy 20 (July 2015): 148. 
31 Lardy, 148. 
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Private Chinese businesses and large state-owned enterprises—both highly 
influenced or controlled outright by the Communist Party—are now able to influence 
hundreds of other countries as financial ties have broadened worldwide. For example, 
Australia, which conducts a significant amount of trade and has many Chinese studying 
there, has noticed Chinese influence spreading within its own government. Merriden 
Varrall claims that politicians are being paid off and the Communist Party of China is 
releasing communist ads in newspapers to sway public opinion.32 It is likely that similar 
occurrences will surface in South America in future years. 
B. CHINA DEVELOPMENT BANK IN SOUTH AMERICA 
China has the largest foreign exchange reserves in the world, and this enables the 
China Development Bank (CDB) to project the communist party’s agenda due to its being 
a state-owned enterprise and having direct ties to the party. In December 2017, reserves 
rose to $3.14 trillion. Although the reserves are not exclusively used by the CDB, the bank 
is the state’s largest foreign exchange lender, is fully owned by the state, and it is able to 
offer lower interest rates and arrange longer-term limits on its loans than other Chinese 
banks.33 The four big Chinese banks have more assets than the CDB, but they are becoming 
more privatized, less influenced by the central government, and are more focused on 
making quick returns on shorter investments. On the contrary, Erica Downs states that the 
CDB is managed by the government and therefore more capable of achieving state agendas, 
while focusing less on profit maximization—while still very important—but more 
concerned about long-term strategic objectives, such as energy security.34  
China directs nearly 40% of its developmental loans to Latin America, which raises 
concerns for the Western Hemisphere because the Chinese state controls the CDB. Dollar 
                                                 
32 Merriden Varrall, “A Chinese Threat to Australian Openness,” New York Times, July 31, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/31/opinion/australia-chinese-students.html. 
33 “China December Forex Reserves Rise to $3.14 Trillion, Highest Since September 2016,” Reuters, 
January 7, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-economy-forex-reserves/china-december-fx-
reserves-rise-to-3-14-trillion-highest-since-sept-2016-central-bank-idUSKBN1EW061. 
34Erica Downs, Inside China, Inc: China Development Bank’s Cross-Border Energy Deals 
(Washington, DC: Brookings, 2011), 64. 
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states, “[Chinese] policy banks lent $118 billion to Latin America between 2007 and 2014: 
53 percent went to Venezuela, 18 percent to Brazil, 12 percent to Ecuador, and 12 percent 
to Argentina.”35 As the state uses the loans to create strategic partnerships, Chinese state-
owned enterprises follow behind the loans to fund additional projects. Figure 1 shows how 
much of these development funds have gone to LAC compared with the rest of the world. 
The fact that the world’s largest state-owned bank is focusing investment in Latin America 
is troubling because most development banks are a conglomeration of multiple states’ 
collective assets and collaborative ideas for proposed projects. However, China holds 
extreme volumes of foreign exchange reserves linked to the CDB, which has nearly four 
times as many assets as the World Bank. 
                                                 
35 David Dollar, “Yes, China Is Investing Globally—But Not So Much In Its Belt and Road 




Figure 1.  Worldwide Distribution of Chinese Development Banks’ Assets ($ billion).36 
Although most of these development funds are from the CDB, a portion comes from 
the Export-Import Bank of China (C-EXIM). The direct linkages to the largest foreign 
exchange reserves, the lowest interest rates, some of the longest-term loans available, and 
oversight by the Chinese government, enable China to project tremendous political-
economic power throughout Latin America. Figure 2 shows how the CDB dwarfs the 
world’s largest development banks and combined with C-EXIM, the Chinese financial 
footprint is very influential. 
                                                 
36 Rohini Kamal and Kevin Gallagher, “China Goes Global With Development Banks,” Bretton 
Woods Project, April 5, 2016, http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2016/04/20508/. 
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Figure 2.  Chinese vs. Western-Backed Development Banks’ Assets ($ billion).37 
The rise of the CDB in South America, as well as the rest of LAC, enables China 
to greatly influence the region. The drop in oil prices in 2008, along with the financial crisis 
that soon followed, caused China to reconsider its foreign exchange reserve portfolio. 
China quickly realized the volatility of investing too heavily in the U.S. market. While 
many oil producing countries needed foreign investment to stay afloat during the oil bust, 
China’s leaders decided to diversify their use of the country’s foreign exchange reserves 
by investing in energy, according to Downs.38 China shifting its investments from U.S. 
treasury bonds towards energy shows how the Chinese government can quickly direct 
finances to meet its strategic objectives. Furthermore, if financial investments are geo-
economic weapons used to influence other countries, a large majority of finance is flowing 
to Latin America to do just that. Allison defines geo-economics as “the use of economic 
instruments (from trade and investment policy to sanctions, cyberattacks, and foreign aid) 
to achieve geopolitical goals.”39 Chinese development abroad is a new phenomenon and 
the possibility of financial investments being used as geo-economic weapons must not be 
carelessly ignored. 
                                                 
37 Kamal and Gallagher. 
38 Downs, Inside China, Inc: China Development Bank’s Cross-Border Energy Deals, 60. 
39 Graham Allison, Destined for War (Boston—New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017), 20. 
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China’s massive foreign exchange reserves, coupled with the Communist Party’s 
ability to communicate and advance its agenda abroad through the CDB, enable 
development funds to be earmarked by the state for specific regions, business sectors, and 
strategic interests. Chinese development loans are also tied to the state’s foreign FDI. The 
Chinese leadership generally establishes strategic partnerships with countries by means of 
large development loans. Once these loans are in place, Chinese state-owned enterprises 
enter the arena with additional investment to finance and construct large projects. Figure 3 
shows the significant amount of Chinese foreign investment in Latin America. 
 
Figure 3.  Distribution of Chinese Overseas Foreign Direct Investment Stock (2013).40 
Figure 3 shows that China has significantly invested in many of its Asian neighbors. 
However, after Asia, Latin America is the next-largest region for Chinese foreign 
investment. While the United States was entangled in the 2008 financial crisis, China 
offered South America alternative FDI in exchange for resources and opportunities to 
increase market interconnectivity. Considering the hype of China’s footprint in Africa, 
                                                 
40 Denise Leung Lihuan Zhou, “China’s Overseas Investments, Explained in 10 Graphics,” World 
Resources Institute, January 28, 2015, http://www.wri.org/blog/2015/01/china%E2%80%99s-overseas-
investments-explained-10-graphics. 
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there is over three times as much investment in Latin America compared to Africa. For this 
reason, it seems necessary to investigate the phenomena. 
In 2005, Chinese annual overseas FDI totaled a mere $13.7 billion, or 1.6% of the 
total world’s overseas FDI, which was $843.8 billion, according to OECD’s calculations.41 
As of 2016, however, Chinese annual overseas FDI has amounted to $217.2 billion, a 15-
fold increase. To put this into perspective, OECD data from 2016 illustrates the world’s 
total annual outflow of FDI as $1.474 trillion; thus Chinese overseas FDI has reached 
nearly 7% of the world’s overseas FDI. 
Additionally, David Shambaugh states that China’s total accumulated overseas FDI 
stock reached $1.2 trillion in 2016 and was right on target as A Capital, a consulting firm, 
had predicted a surge of $800 billion between 2011 and 2016.42 Figure 4 shows the 
exponential growth of overseas FDI since China implemented its going-out strategy. 
 
Figure 4.  China’s Cumulative Overseas Investment (1990–2016).43 
                                                 
41 Author based his calculations in this paragraph on data derived from OECD: 
https://data.oecd.org/foreign direct investment/foreign direct investment-flows.htm#indicator-chart 
42 David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (Oxford—New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 178. 
43 “World Investment Report 2017: Annex Tables,” United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, accessed January 24, 2018, 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/Annex-Tables.aspx.Note: Author 
constructed chart from data from United Nations World Investment Report for 2017. 
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This significant growth in overseas investment correlates with the growth of 
China’s exponential reserve growth. This can be problematic for reasons stated by Robert 
Blackwill and Jennifer Harris: “Time and time again in modern history hard power has 
followed where capital leads, flowing from advanced economies to developing nations 
regardless of religion, culture, and ideology of the home country.”44 Furthermore, China’s 
economy has matured, the country has more buying power, and the Communist Party of 
China has significantly more potential to influence abroad, including in South America. 
China’s leaders certainly hope that it will not need to abandon its non-interfering approach 
to protect its investments abroad. 
C. POLITICAL-ECONOMIC MOTIVATIONS FOR CHINESE OVERSEAS 
INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AMERICA 
China’s current objectives for its overseas investments, according to Katherine 
Koleski, are to continue importing raw materials while using its indigenous innovation to 
produce higher-value-added products for export worldwide.45 South America’s desire to 
trade raw materials complements Chinese aim to import low-cost materials with which to 
fabricate higher-value-added products for resale at much higher profits. Nevertheless, these 
are not the only motivators at play. 
China is likely using these investments to buy influence while simultaneously 
achieving its primary goal of securing natural resources. As Robert Gilpin states, FDI is an 
“overall strategy to develop permanent position in another economy.”46 These patterns of 
economic behavior suggest that China has long-term objectives for investing in South 
America. Additionally, Gilpin mentions that multinational corporations do have a political 
and economic effect on a country because of FDI.47 Increasing Chinese foreign investment 
in South America over the next several years will likely strengthen China’s political 
                                                 
44 Robert D. Blackwill and Jennifer M. Harris, War by Other Means (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2016), 143. 
45 Katherine Koleski, “The 13th Five-Year Plan,” n.d., 38, 
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/The%2013th%20Five-Year%20Plan.pdf. 
46 Robert Gilpin, Age of the Multinational (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 164. 
47 Gilpin, 171–172. 
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leverage and give South America financing and business opportunities as projects, mergers, 
and new business models began to take shape and produce results. Eugene Gholz, Umul 
Awan, and Ehud Ronn state, “perhaps China is using loans-for-oil to cultivate diplomatic 
ties, making them a way to ‘buy friends,’ as foreign aid has often been used in the past.”48  
Not only is China seeking new allies and selling its brand abroad, but the country 
is benefiting from the acquisition of abundant South American raw materials. According 
to Gallagher, the top four commodity exports from South America are iron ore, soy, copper, 
and oil.49 These are essential to keep Chinese factories supplied and workers fed, enabling 
them to continue producing a large share of the world’s products. Gallagher mentions that 
this new reliance on natural resource exports to China is causing South America to become 
more vulnerable to the resource curse, as 86% percent of its exports to China are primary 
commodities instead of diversified manufactured products. On the other hand, Gallagher 
states that South America averages 56% primary commodities and 40% manufactured 
goods exported to the rest of the world.50 This breakdown highlights the potential for 
atrophy of manufacturing jobs in South America as commodity exports increase. Not only 
does this create lead to de-industrialization, but commodities are more susceptible to 
shocks than manufactured goods and can lead to more severe economic downturns. 
Further highlighting the potential for South American countries to be susceptible to 
commodity shocks is the fact that a significant portion of the Chinese loans have gone 
towards the energy sector—mainly oil. The China-Latin America Finance Database shows, 
in Figure 5, which sectors have received the most financing. 
                                                 
48 Eugene Gholz, Umul Awan, and Ehud Ronn, “Financial and Energy Security Analysis of China’s 
Loan-for-Oil Deals,” Energy Research & Social Science 24, no. Supplement C (February 1, 2017): 49. 
49 Gallagher, The China Triangle: Latin America’s China Boom and the Fate of the Washington 
Consensus, 45. 
50 Gallagher, 45. 
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Figure 5.  Purpose of Chinese Loans in Latin America.51 
The data shows that 71% of Chinese loans have gone to energy, 17% to 
infrastructure, 10% to “other,” and merely 1% to mining. Downs claims that the focus on 
energy reinforces the fact that all of CDB’s projects must be approved by China’s State 
Council and therefore disproportionately align with the party’s agenda to secure long-term 
energy contracts.52 Furthermore, it provides Chinese national oil companies (NOCs) with 
opportunities for exploration and production overseas since domestic reserves are 
insufficient for China’s needs. China also benefits from acquiring and maintaining a 
technological edge in the oil industry while producing significant oil revenues for the state 
abroad.  
Although oil is only China’s fourth-largest import from the region, the country has 
made its largest loans in exchange for oil and energy security. The growing Chinese middle 
class will demand more energy to feed new cars and appliances as well as for the production 
of other goods that a country of 1.4 billion people will come to expect. A common argument 
is that the Chinese economy’s growth rate will slow and oil demand may decrease. Despite 
China’s decline from double-digit GDP growth toward 6 or 7% in 2016, it was four times 
                                                 
51 “Inter-American Dialogue,” China-Latin America Finance Database, accessed January 24, 2018, 
https://www.thedialogue.org/map_list/. 
52Downs, Inside China, Inc: China Development Bank’s Cross-Border Energy Deals, 80. 
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the growth rate of the United States. Additionally, Qiang Wang and Rongrong Li claim, 
“China’s oil consumption will continually increase from 10.7 million barrels per day (bpd) 
in 2020, then to 16.9 million bpd in 2030, and then to 20.0 million bpd in 2040.”53 Figure 
6 reaffirms that the country’s oil needs have increased 14% since 2016 and are not likely 
to decrease any time soon. 
 
 
Figure 6.  2017 Chinese Crude Oil Imports (Millions of Tons).54 
Not only does Figure 6 show the increase in oil imports to China, but it also shows 
that Middle Eastern shares of oil exports are not growing as quickly as those from South 
America and Africa. This trend has two implications. First, China is decreasing its 
dependence on Middle Eastern oil, which is susceptible to wars, blockades of the Strait of 
Hormuz, and regional confrontations with the U.S. military. Second, and more important 
to the Western Hemisphere, is the fact that China is using its excess foreign exchange 
reserves to reduce over-reliance on investments in U.S. bonds. Instead, it is diversifying its 
                                                 
53 Qiang Wang and Rongrong Li, “Sino-Venezuelan Oil-For-Loan Deal – The Chinese Strategic 
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foreign exchange reserves with natural resources in regions where it can use those same 
funds to both secure resources and build potential strategic partnerships and alliances 
through long-term loan arrangements. 
Not only have some South American countries wanted to shift their investment 
portfolios from the United States after the 2008 financial crisis, but China also wishes to 
diversify against its holdings of U.S. bonds. But, Gholz et al. state that China provides 
subsidized loans in exchange for oil by paying higher-than-market prices for the oil, which 
would not be a good investment strategy if it were trying to reduce its holdings in U.S. 
treasuries.55 It is easy to see why South American countries want to partner with China if 
they are guaranteed large sums of money over a long period of time and with the assurance 
that they will be paid near-current-market prices for oil over the term of the loan. Gholz et 
al. also state, “Chinese officials acknowledge the safety and reliability of U.S. Treasury 
bonds, where they have invested some $1.16 trillion, but they hope to slowly reduce the 
proportion of their reserves allocated to U.S. Treasuries.”56 They do not agree, however, 
that China intends for economic reasons to reduce its holdings of U.S. securities in favor 
of oil. Instead, it seems that it has adjusted its portfolio for geo-economic reasons, such as 
to increase trade linkages and to develop new, untapped markets. 
Furthermore, the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative is designed to reduce the 
country’s excess capacity and employ thousands of Chinese citizens by building a network 
of roads to link western China with much of Southwest Asia, the Middle East, and even 
Europe. Similar to this project are many large projects under way in Latin America to meet 
Chinese labor demands. These projects also allow it to create trade linkages to regions that 
are underdeveloped and could mutually benefit from China’s excess capacities in steel, 
labor, and cheap exports. Communist party leadership fears that if they are not able to 
continue high growth rates, the rising middle class may slump back into poverty, 
potentially causing widespread rioting across the country and even contestation of the 
communist party.  
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46. 
56 Gholz, Awan, and Ronn, 46. 
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Construction has outpaced demand, indicating that either a) excess capacity was 
used to create employment at any cost to avoid political unrest or b) China plans to 
dramatically urbanize more of the country as rural citizens are incrementally allowed by 
the Communist Party to migrate to these cities. Richard Gray states that the Chinese have 
built more than 50 cities that are not currently inhabited or being utilized (“ghost cities”) 
and between 2011 and 2013, China used more concrete than the United States used in all 
of the 20th century.57 This is further reasoning for China to seek infrastructure projects in 
Latin America to keep Chinese firms engaged and citizens employed worldwide as its own 
economy has reached saturation. On the other hand, this phenomenon indicates that China 
is preparing its cities to continue to dominate the manufacturing and technical industry 
while relying on raw materials from abroad to supplement urban agricultural and extractive 
industries. 
Ultimately, China is planting deep financial roots in South America that will not 
likely be uprooted anytime soon. Heriberto Araujo and Juan Pablo Cardenal put it best: 
“By buying companies, exploiting natural resources, building infrastructure and giving 
loans all over the world, China is pursuing a soft but unstoppable form of economic 
domination.”58 Whether China has intentionally funded anti-American regimes in South 
America or simply meant to purchase more shares of oil, the Communist Party’s influence 
will likely be felt for many years to come. Additionally, if South America enjoys more 
growth from the Chinese model over the next decade, U.S. influence in the region will be 
greatly threatened because it failed to perform for South America from the 1980s to the 
turn of the 21st century. 
D. LATIN AMERICA’S INTEREST IN CHINESE INVESTMENT 
As left-leaning leaders, such as President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, President 
Evo Morales of Bolivia, and President Rafael Correa of Ecuador, teamed up to form the 
Bolivarian Alliance of the Americas (ALBA), it was evident that South America was 
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largely detesting U.S. policies. This Bolivarian movement was formed to unite South 
America by forming the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR) or the common 
market of the South. This detachment was additionally favored by President Luiz Inacio 
Lula da Silva of Brazil and President Cristina Kirchner of Argentina and began further 
pronounced as the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas failed to launch. Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, and Venezuela had opposed the free trade agreement that was supposed to 
mirror that of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) due to worries of U.S. 
agricultural subsidies destroying agricultural jobs in their countries. Additionally, they 
feared that U.S. multinational corporations would not pay the local citizens their fair share 
of profits in the region, while exporting raw materials and leaving barren wasteland.59 
China’s reserves came at an once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to fill the Western cash 
cow’s void as the 2008 financial crisis hit and South America sought funding. The cash 
offerings that China now proposes to the international community have become more 
appealing to many foreign countries than compared to the Western led Bretton Woods 
institutions—due to traditional loans having shorter terms, higher interest, and more 
stipulations. China’s going out, coupled with cash, has built many megastructures abroad 
to further Chinese prestige around the world. Eric Helleiner and Jonathan Kirshner state 
that monetary power becomes more apparent as a country is able to export sizable capital 
and provide crisis financing.60 This occurred post-2008 financial crisis as less developed 
countries latched onto Chinese loans as the United States focused on fixing their financial 
mess and restricted their loan process, while China liberally opened their loan floodgates 
with sizable loans capable of completing almost any task imaginable. 
South America was attracted to Chinese investment mostly to attempt something 
other than what had not been working for them during the Washington Consensus—1980s 
to the turn of the 21st century. Additionally, Chinese banks became more enticing to the 
world as China’s lack of conditionality and non-interventionist attitude was portrayed to 
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countries that were tired of meeting U.S. demands of maintaining particular levels of 
democratic processes and deficit reduction policies. The World Bank had increased 
conditions that recipient countries needed to meet in the 1980s to protect the World Bank’s 
assets as well as ensuring effective outcomes of its loans. In the case of South America, 
loans were riskier than usual and significant conditions were placed on them. Diego 
Hernandez claims these efforts were aimed at taming economic imbalances and 
establishing a foundation for long-term growth.61 However, long-term growth was usually 
lacking and thus South America’s search for alternative methods. 
As economic conditions in South America weakened, with correlating weakening 
relations with the United States, it is likely that South America witnessed African success 
stories of Chinese investment. Adrienne Klasa states that in 2015, China was only the ninth 
largest contributor of capital investment in Africa but more importantly ranked seventh for 
the number of projects there. The Chinese also created over 14,000 jobs in Africa and more 
than any other country.62 These findings will likely continue to give hope to other regions, 
such as South America, who hope to benefit from more jobs, growth, and infrastructure 
development. 
The China boom, or also known as the “commodity lottery” for Latin America as 
coined by Gallagher, occurred from 2003 to 2013. It benefited much of Latin America as 
China’s appetite for natural resources and attached infrastructure projects fueled 3.6% 
average economic growth per year in Latin America. On the other hand, the Washington 
Consensus was implemented in Latin America in 1982, and for nearly two decades 
averaged only 2.4% growth per year and ended with the 2008 financial crisis, according to 
Gallagher.63 Most of the growth during the China boom was due to the increase in 
commodity exports, fueled by China’s demand for resources and agricultural products.   
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China has met South America’s financial needs as western banks have been outbid 
by Chinese banks. Figure 7 shows that the top five Latin American recipients of Chinese 
loans are all in South America and account for over 95% of Chinese loans in Latin America. 
 
Figure 7.  Chinese Loans: Quantity and Amount by Latin American Country.64 
                                                 
64 “Inter-American Dialogue.” 
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The data indicates that economic ties are growing deeper with China in South 
America. Research on China’s increase in aid to Africa found that fewer conditions were 
placed on the same countries, by the World Bank, due to competition with Chinese banks. 
However, Hernandez states that maintaining transparency, fighting corruption, and 
increasing democracy were found to be more challenging.65 Although circumstances in 
Africa may be different than South America’s, there is an argument to be made that South 
America is more susceptible to corruption and a decrease in democracy and transparency 
due to less restrictions on loans as Chinese loans have increased competition and lowered 
conditionality for investment. 
Despite South America’s excitement for the rapid economic growth during the last 
decade, it raises the question of how long it will last, as economic growth may be temporary 
as commodity boom and bust cycles go and come. Gallagher states, “During the 
Washington Consensus period Latin American governments put an end to high inflation 
and fiscal irresponsibility. What is more, the period ushered in a return to democracy.”66 It 
is evident that an authoritarian regression has occurred in Venezuela as Chinese funding 
boosted Chavismo and now propels Maduro’s ambitions to rewrite the constitution and 
ensure the extension of his power. However, what is yet to be seen is how freedom and 
democracy will be affected in Argentina as investment shifts, between two completely 
different forms of government, to finance President Macri’s center-right and business 
oriented administration. 
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III. VENEZUELA’S TRADE AND INVESTMENT FAILURES 
WITH CHINA: A CASE STUDY 
“This country will eventually fall into the hands of the unbridled mob, and 
will proceed to almost imperceptible petty tyrannies of all complexions and 
races.” 
—Simon Bolivar 
 “It is the devil’s excrement. We are drowning in the devil’s excrement.” 
—Juan Pablo Perez Alfonso, former Venezuelan oil minister 
 
Poor relations between the United States and Venezuela, coupled with the 2008 
financial crisis, aligned China’s state-owned development banks with Venezuela’s 
socialist, anti-American president—Hugo Chavez. This chapter provides the background 
for Chinese energy security needs and the void the Chinese filled as the anti-American rise 
occurred in Venezuela. Finally, the last section debates whether or not the Sino-Venezuelan 
relationship benefits Venezuela. 
A. CHINA’S INTERESTS IN VENEZUELA 
As President Chavez was cutting ties with Bretton Woods institutions and 
distancing his country from U.S. influence, China was more than willing to use its influence 
and economic power to fill the gap. As Christopher Balding states, “China’s interests in 
gaining friends in the Western Hemisphere while securing access to oil overlapped with 
Venezuela’s interest in diversifying its customer base away from the United States.”67 
These conditions allowed China to gain a foothold in the Western Hemisphere, while 
shielding Venezuela from U.S. politics.  
China’s important financial reserves allow their NOCs to invest in risky regions 
where private firms are currently not willing to enter or where entry is not possible or even 
granted. According to Deborah Brautigam and Kevin Gallagher, “in countries without good 
credit ratings, a resource guarantee increases security and lowers risk, and allows projects 
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to be financed at a reasonable interest rate.”68 China was convinced that investment risk in 
Venezuela could be minimized by securing their funding through “resource-secured” 
financing. 
For example, China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) and Petróleos de 
Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) began talks in 2009 and have signed more agreements in 2017, 
allowing China to build the Nanhai 400,000 bpd refinery that will be located in Jieyang, 
Guangdong Province, China. The joint venture of CNPC-PDVSA has already teamed up 
in Venezuela’s Orinoco heavy belt to form Petrourica and Petro Sinovensa. Venezuelan 
heavy crude will be processed in the Chinese refinery and operations are slated to begin 
upon completion in 2020, according to Robert Brelsford.69 This benefits the Chinese and 
enables Venezuela to eventually not have to rely on exporting crude to American refineries, 
shielding Venezuela from the U.S. economy and sanctions.  
Despite China’s efforts to tap into the world’s largest oil reserves, the Chinese have 
found it to be extremely difficult, as the United States has experienced, to be profitable in 
Venezuela. Oil production is at a 23-year low, oil rig counts are decreasing drastically and 
oil shipments are late. Other investments in railways and infrastructure have been 
terminated. For example, Simon Romero states that Chavez intended for a 290 mile, high-
speed railway to be built and functioning as of 2012 but as of 2017, the Chinese have 
packed up and left the project incomplete as Venezuela’s economy has failed.70 
Additionally, John Perry claims, 350,000 homes have been built between 2011 and 2012, 
to try and meet Chavez’s lofty goal of three million homes by 2019.71 This accomplishment 
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was applauded back in 2013 but four years later after massive socialist expenditures and 
low oil prices, the country is in shambles. Daniel Lansberg-Rodriguez claims that China is 
now trying to salvage its largest loans and investments in Venezuela—China’s largest 
debtor—and hoping that Maduro’s replacements are Chavistas, who will not claim odious 
debt due to unlawful legislation of acquiring it in the first place.72 
The mere existence of vast quantities of oil in Venezuela makes a complementary 
arrangement for China and Venezuela to depend on one another. However, poor relations 
between the United States and Venezuela, coupled with the 2008 financial crisis, further 
aligned China’s state-owned development banks with Venezuela’s socialist, anti-American 
president. Additionally, these conditions enabled China to gain a foothold in the Western 
Hemisphere, while shielding Venezuela from U.S. politics. Furthermore, Balding states, 
“China’s interests in gaining friends in the Western Hemisphere while securing access to 
oil overlapped with Venezuela’s interest in diversifying its customer base away from the 
United States.”73 
China’s massive financial reserves allow its NOCs to invest in risky regions that 
private firms are not willing to enter or where entry is not possible. China was convinced 
that investment risk in Venezuela could be minimized by securing their funding through 
“resource-secured” financing.74 
B. VENEZUELA’S INTERESTS IN CHINA 
As nationalism rose with the economic decline in the late 1990s, Chavismo was 
born in 1999. Soon after Chavez’s election, he began to expel foreign investment and to 
give the state larger control over Venezuela’s number one revenue source: oil. Venezuela 
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has the largest estimated oil reserves in the world: more than 298 billion barrels.75 
Venezuela relies on oil for 96% of its export revenue.76 Chavez’s efforts were to regain 
control of its prized commodity from international oil companies (IOCs) because they 
seemed to primarily benefit U.S. companies. His administration promised to return the 
profits to Venezuela’s citizens. However, Michael Ross states, “IOCs were generally 
blamed for problems within developing oil countries prior to the 1970s and then most 
countries nationalized their oil industries in the 19701s but the resource curse and ill effects 
of oil have not resulted in more efficiencies and these countries that have nationalized are 
worse off today.77 
The majority of oil-rich developing countries nationalized their oil sectors in the 
1970s, including Venezuela, which nationalized its oil in 1976 and formed PDVSA, 
according to Matt Smith.78 Later, according to Mamdouh Salameh, “Venezuela re-opened 
its upstream oil sector [in the 1990s] to private investment. This policy facilitated the 
creation of 32 operating service agreements and four strategic associations, each operated 
by a non-PDVSA entity. In recent years, Venezuela has moved to largely undo most of 
these initiatives.”79 Because the regime did as much as possible to nationalize the oil 
industry and force foreign industry out of the country, Chavez also relied on Chinese 
investment to make possible the transition and “Bolivarian revolution.”  
As oil prices rose during the early 2000s and the Chavez regime enjoyed a surplus 
of petrodollars, it was in the regime’s best interests to fund a variety of social programs to 
gain support for his Bolivarian revolution. Chavez set up several Bolivarian Missions and 
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he launched efforts to develop better public infrastructure that would both benefit the 
impoverished. One example of the Bolivarian Missions was a program called “Gran 
Volumen,” or Great Volume, which operated under the banner of “Mi Casa Bien 
Equipada,” or My Well-Equipped Home. The program put into the hands of poor citizens 
such Chinese products as washers, dryers, televisions, DVD players, stoves, and the like, 
according to Fidel Vasquez I.80 These initiatives were popular for the masses and boosted 
support for Chavismo. These Bolivarian Missions also benefitted the Chinese because they 
increased the flow of Chinese exports to South America as well as provide opportunities 
for Chinese companies to win contracts to build homes, railways, and other large 
infrastructure projects. 
President Chavez’s Bolivarian revolution took full control of PDVSA in the early 
2000s, thus channeling PDVSA’s revenues to fund his new social programs. In 2004, two-
thirds of PDVSA’s budget went to these programs. Furthermore, high oil prices in the mid-
2000s expedited Chavez’s agenda, and Chinese funding further supported his populist 
programs; whether China intentionally backed them or not, Chinese loans and investments 
were instrumental in maintaining support for the regime as oil prices plummeted in mid-
2008. These windfalls helped feed Chavez’s socialist policies and helped him achieve the 
popularity he needed to stay in power. As Francisco Monaldi states, “the consumption 
bonanza, allowed by the increasing imports that were fueled by the surge in oil export 
revenues and the increase in foreign debt, enabled the president to have relatively high 
levels of popularity and easily win re-elections in 2006 and 2012.”81 
Additionally, the nationalization of PDVSA enabled Chavez to purchase in 2007 a 
majority share of oil projects in the Orinoco belt for $30 billion, which caused 
                                                 
80 Fidel E. Vásquez I, “1.200.000 Electrodomésticos Han Sido Distribuidos Por Mi Casa Bien 
Equipada,” Aristóbulo Istúriz, March 16, 2012, http://aristobulo.psuv.org.ve/2012/03/16/canpana/1-200-
000-electrodomesticos-han-sido-distribuidos-por-mi-casa-bien-equipada/. 
81 Francisco J. Monaldi, “Is Resource Nationalism Fading in Latin America? The Case of the Oil 




ConocoPhillips and ExxonMobil to leave Venezuela.82 Furthermore, in 2010 he seized 
11 oil rigs belonging to U.S. company Helmerich & Payne Inc.83 Oil nationalization 
seemed to be largely effective due to abnormally high oil prices generating enormous state 
revenues during the commodity boom, which gave Venezuela more financial freedom from 
foreign companies than dependence on them. 
C. CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINA’S ATTRACTIVE LOANS (THAT LEAD 
TO INCREASED INVESTMENT) 
Despite the oil boom, Venezuela was determined to create a coalition with China 
that would free it from U.S. influence. Chinese loans began in 2007 and increases in 
Chinese investment followed after the 2008 financial crisis.  
The majority of Chinese loans take the form of loans-for-oil from the state-owned 
CDB, while others are linked to infrastructure investment in exchange for oil. Venezuela 
receives the money up front to use as the government pleases and then ships oil to China. 
China pays for that oil at current market prices and places the revenues in a Chinese state-
owned bank and either uses the oil at home or sells it to other lucrative markets. Managers 
of the Chinese fund deduct payments for loan principal and interest from the oil revenue 
until its loan to Venezuela is paid in full. Figure 8 shows all of the loans that China has 
provided Venezuela from the first in 2007 to the latest in 2016. Since 2016, Venezuela has 
been struggling to meet its debt payments, and, according to open sources, China has made 
no further loans. Jack Stubbs and Deisy Buitrago argue, however, that Russia has made 
concessions to Venezuela to restructure debt to ease the burden, and China’s foreign 
ministry has stated that it will treat the debt situation “appropriately.”84 
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Figure 8.  Chinese Loans to Venezuela.85 
The majority of the loans are directed towards the energy sector. There are a couple 
smaller loans involving the mining sector as well as two loans focused on infrastructure. 
Despite the fact that China was considering cutting financial ties with Venezuela in 2016, 
PDVSA signed agreements with the CDB again in June 2017 to finance potentially 700 
other projects with Venezuela, many being in the oil sector, according to Brelsford.86 
However, all the loans serve the same purpose of extracting resources for China to import 
them more quickly and efficiently back home.  
As far as Venezuelan politics are concerned, much of the loans went into 
the FONDEN fund or Venezuela’s national development fund. According to Antulio 
Rosales, “Official estimates show that the Venezuelan government has invested over 
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USD 115 billion through FONDEN in various infrastructure, productive and social projects 
and, generally, over USD 600 billion have been invested in social spending in the past 14 
years of Bolivarian government.”87 He further suggests that FONDEN has been a source 
of embezzlement and highly difficult for critics to scrutinize. Without the conditions that 
Bretton Woods institutions placed on loan agreements, Chinese loans make it easy for 
Venezuela’s government to not have to answer to anyone, which can lead a regime to 
become more authoritarian in nature. Furthermore, Pedro Palma, a Venezuelan economist, 
argues that “the Venezuelan government feels it has the right to loot resources from the 
Central Bank and PDVSA” and that the funds “are resources for which the Central Bank 
and PDVSA receive no compensation at all and end up spent discretionally by the 
President.”88 
Chinese loans to Venezuela increased dramatically since the 2008 financial crisis 
and provided Venezuela with “patient capital” versus short-term capital with its associated 
restraints according to Kaplan.89 He also states, “Unlike the short-term horizon of private 
market capital, patient capital is characterized by both a long-term horizon and long-term 
relationships.”90 Chinese patient capital allows anywhere from 2 to 28.5 year term 
agreements, which is much longer than Bretton Woods institutions’ loan terms and 
therefore, are more appealing to regimes seeking long-term survival, according to 
Brautigam et al.91 This shadow of the future, coupled with fewer stipulations, provides 
hope for countries, such as Venezuela, to allow projects to mature and come to fruition 
without fear of intervention by the United States, IMF, or World Bank.  
Although loans and investments are distinct, China provides both to Venezuela. 
Between 2005 and 2016, Chinese investments totaled $20.74 billion piling on top of the 
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$62.2 billion loan debt. The energy sector had $11 billion of Chinese investment, followed 
by $2.45 billion in the construction sector, and $1.49 billion in agriculture.92 With the crisis 
underway in Venezuela, investments in the energy sector continued to climb to $4.58 
billion from 2015–2016. These investments were likely mandated by the Chinese 
government to ensure its other loans—tied to energy security—would not be lost, as the 
China Energy Engineering Corporation (CEEC) and CNPC further invested in the troubled 
economy. 
D. RESULTS OF THE SINO-VENEZUELAN RELATIONSHIP 
China’s loans-for-oil as well as Chinese investments have created an environment 
that has allowed the situation in Venezuela to deteriorate rapidly due to China’s non-
interventionist attitude and Venezuela’s authoritarian style of leadership, which result in 
fewer mediums for answering to the voice of Venezuelan citizens. The proper economic 
controls are not in place to maintain a country where all can benefit in the long-term. On 
the contrary, short-term windfalls have created patrimonial relationships to win votes and 
fuel the regime. Safeguards have been eroded as the rewriting of the Venezuela 
constitution, laws, and makeup of its country have occurred and China does not seem to 
care that these regressions have occurred. 
Chinese resource-secured loans have been the lifeline for the Venezuelan 
government as crude oil production has plummeted. According to Lucia Kassai and Sheela 
Tobben, crude production hit a 29-year low in 2017.93 Chinese financing has further 
enabled President Maduro to further his ambitious restructuring of the Venezuelan 
government—while avoiding a coup—even as inflation hit a record high of 800% in 
December 2016.94 The military has taken control over scarce food supplies and it seems 
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likely that the military will continue to receive the money it needs to remain loyal to 
Maduro’s regime. There is no transparency in the loans, which allows Maduro to channel 
funds as he deems necessary. As Michael Todaro and Stephen Smith state, “some 
economists argue that greater openness to trade beneficially affects the subsequent 
evolution of institutions.”95 As Chinese investment has increased with Venezuela, there is 
an argument to be made that Chinese styles of governance are also spilling over into 
Venezuela’s government styles. 
Not only have funds been used for social projects and to boost the military, but with 
the intent to gain the popular vote. This suggests that many people were benefiting from 
Chinese funding during the China boom, since they were sufficiently happy and willing to 
continue voting for Chavez. However, Jorge Giordani, President Chavez’s Planning 
Minister for 10 years, claims that in order for Chavez to have won his third election in 
2012, extreme amounts of money had to be utilized.96 This new source of revenue has both 
allowed the Venezuelan regime to prolong their agenda and power, while shaking off the 
chains of the World Bank. Even though the World Bank has heavy stipulations on loans, 
there is room for corruption within these fairly transparent loans. For example, Hernandez 
states, “while the World Bank has the fundamental interest to use conditionality as an 
instrument to ensure the effectiveness of its projects, the recipient government might turn 
to the World Bank for financial assistance to remain in office and implement a set of 
preferred policies while in power.”97 Since Chinese loans have fewer stipulations and less 
transparency, there is a significant opportunity for increased levels of corruption.  
Chinese investment has been an enabler of the populist regime, as development 
funds have poured into Venezuela at opportune times to boost social programs and populist 
support. Additionally, the loans have not been adequately used to boost Venezuela’s oil 
industry. Furthermore, it is surprising that the industry is it its current condition given that 
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$3.29 billion of investments have been specifically earmarked for PDVSA.98 It is the 
appeal of the long-term, unconditional loans that give Venezuela’s populist regime room 
to maneuver as it sees fit, while leading to disastrous results as the government has done a 
poor job of managing its crown jewel—PDVSA. The NOC is in shambles. Although 
Caracas is failing to maintain ageing oil industry infrastructure and failing to provide 
incentives for qualified oil industry technicians and businesses, China’s non-interventionist 
posture has not benefited Venezuelan citizens. China has too much money at stake to 
publicly pressure the regime to step down in order to give Venezuelans their voice back. If 
regime change occurred, Venezuelans would likely claim odious debt and China would be 
forced to incur large losses. 
For example, two-thirds of PVDSA’s budget went to social programs in 2004 
according to Ross.99 Although oil prices were high, Venezuela did not invest money back 
into ageing refineries, rigs, and oil tankers, but spent unreasonably high amounts of the 
budget in low cost housing, medicine, education, and other similar programs, to boost the 
popularity of Chavismo. To further demonstrate, as Chavez was seeking a third six-year 
term, he tapped into the $20 billion Chinese loan to help turn the vote. According to Downs, 
“Chávez announced on September 21, 2010—less than a week before the legislative 
elections—that $1 billion from CDB’s loan would be used to finance the construction of 
25,000 houses for people living in the slums of Caracas, traditional Chávez strongholds 
where the president’s popularity has been waning.”100  
As Venezuela is trying to make loans-for-oil payments back to China, there is less 
and less of a margin for profit from their oil due to the price collapse of oil in 2014. Rosales 
states it best: “Venezuela’s appropriation of oil rents is changing radically, whereby it is 
spending today tomorrow’s rents.”101 Figure 9 shows how Venezuela is even late on large 
shipments of oil to China due to a shrinking supply of oil. 
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Figure 9.  Venezuela’s Late Oil Shipments to China and Russia.102 
The data shows that Venezuela’s oil refining capability is behind as it is unable to 
ship its oil commitments to its largest debtor despite being the largest recipient of Chinese 
loans in the world. Venezuela’s late shipments of crude oil are problematic but what is 
even more worrying is Venezuela’s degenerative capability for producing higher value-
added, refined oil shipments. Currently Venezuela is late on 23 cargo shipments of refined 
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crude to China, while only late on four shipments of plain crude. With China building 
refineries in China as well as their NOCs owning significant portions of oil companies and 
refineries around the globe, it is likely that China prefers crude oil shipments. This enables 
its NOCs to further refine the oil and sell it for higher value-added on the world market, 
while Venezuela loses out in that profitable process. 
PDVSA is also unable to pay for parts and maintenance of oil rigs to pump the oil, 
so few oil rigs are supplying oil to the company—and therefore the regime and country as 
a whole. According to Figure 10, in September 2015, 74 rigs were supply oil and in June 
2017, only 49 were supplying oil. Marianna Parraga and Mircely Guanipa state that 
workers from PDVSA claim that “the problems have particularly affected crude units as 
oil has been diverted away from some PDVSA’s refineries to pay foreign debts, leaving 
insufficient feedstock for distillation.”103  
 
Figure 10.  Oil Rigs Servicing PDVSA’s Oil Supply.104 
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Chinese demand for crude is killing Venezuela’s domestic oil refining capabilities, 
as less crude is available to distill domestically. The majority of crude is being shipped 
overseas before being distilled into a higher value-added product. Venezuela is benefiting 
from the exports of crude but it would benefit much more if Venezuela refined the crude 
in Venezuela to produce increased amounts of jet fuel, gasoline, and other fuel oils first, to 
later be shipped to China as a finished product. This would increase oil profits, create more 
domestic jobs, and most importantly maintain refineries and domestic expertise. However, 
domestic higher value-added production is grinding to a halt, while Venezuela’s 
dependence on oil is being amplified. In 1999—the beginning of Chavez’s reign—only 
69% of total export revenues were oil shares and as of 2014, 96% of export revenues were 
being generated by oil according to Felix Chang.105 Venezuela is in need of institutional 
reform to create an economy less dependent on oil and more open to new technologies and 
products but it appears that China will continue importing Venezuelan oil while letting the 
Maduro regime take any and all measures it deems necessary. 
In summary, Venezuela’s economy is facing severe challenges a decade and a half 
after Chavismo began. It can be argued that abnormally low oil prices have contributed to 
the problems. However, many other oil-producing countries have not suffered such severe 
financial problems following the price drop. Chinese loans directly correlate and contribute 
to Venezuela’s problems, although they are seldom linked to the undermining problems. 
Venezuela’s populist regime has had extreme budget surpluses due to high oil prices, 
coupled with being the largest recipient of Chinese loans in the world. Chavez was able to 
use the proceeds to push populist projects (i.e., housing, education, medicine, and 
appliances), to gain votes. However, Chinese loans and investments have been less helpful 
to the public than imagined, especially recently as infrastructure projects have failed as 
resources have dried up. Although many citizens once received some government 
spending, it has not been enough to compensate for the generally terrible economic 
conditions today. 
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The economic conditions that Venezuelans are facing today are tied to an 
irresponsible government, coupled with Chinese unconditional loans, further investments 
from Chinese state-owned enterprises, and China’s laissez-faire attitude towards countries 
it is courting. This neglect by both parties has led to the oil industry falling apart. Logic 
would lead one to believe that with China’s focus on oil, and Venezuela’s reliance on oil 
to boost its regime, oil production would be at an all-time high and Venezuelan oil 
producing facilities would be state-of-the-art, due to massive Chinese loans and significant 
amounts of investment. However, such neglect now highlights the losses of the poor 
policies of the populist regime. Venezuela could easily benefit from increased ties with 
China but focus would have to revolve around becoming less reliant on oil rents, while 
shifting efforts towards the diversification of the country’s revenues. However, 
Venezuela’s crown jewel oil industry has been grossly neglected as rigs, refineries, and 
tankers are in shambles and oil production is at a historic low.  
It is time that Venezuelan citizens demand that technical expertise be allowed back 
into the country to fix the broken oil industry without fear of reprisal, demand that Chinese 
loans made without legislative concurrence be claimed as odious, and begin ramping up 
efforts to progressively produce more refined products in their homeland to then be shipped 
to Chinese markets. According to Matt Ferchen, “given how little traction regional and 
other multilateral efforts to engage with Venezuela have gained, and in light of China’s 
massive loans-for-oil ties to Venezuela, Beijing’s role must be more carefully understood 
and scrutinized.”106 Venezuela’s institutions have used oil revenue to bypass the need to 
tax its people, leading to increased corruption and authoritarian rule. This has led to 
regimes, driven by popular support of highly demanded social programs, with too much 
financial power, resulting in increased influence, and the subsequent deterioration of 
democracy. Institutional changes are the only course corrections that will likely correct the 
problems. 
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IV. A CASE STUDY OF ARGENTINA’S DIVERSIFIED 
CHINESE INVESTMENT  
“What does President Xi Jinping want? In one line: to ‘Make China Great 
Again.’”  
—Graham Allison, 2017 
 
“We are laying the groundwork from which a country can grow. Those 
were the changes we needed, but no one implemented them because they 
didn’t dare to think long-term. It was easier to see the short term. It’s 
attractive, but in the end it leaves people worse off.”  
—President Mauricio Macri, 2017 
 
This chapter compares the Chinese investment relationship with Venezuela in 
comparison with other investors in the region. It also provides the historical context of how 
Argentina’s 2001 economic crisis unfolded and how it led to the courting of China. It then 
describes the reforms that both President Kirchners’ populist left administrations enacted 
to reverse the crisis, and how these opened the door to Chinese investments in Argentina. 
Next, as the “pink tide” or left-leaning leaders of the first decade of the 21st century faded, 
center-right presidents in South America began to pop up. President Macri of Argentina 
was one of these and is now responsible for balancing the investments of his country. 
Finally, Argentina’s experiences with China are compared and contrasted with 
Venezuela’s previous case study to determine if Chinese investment has benefited 
Argentina over the past decade and a half. Findings suggest that Argentina’s investment 
diversification with several countries have allowed it to not excessively rely on China but 
Argentina does need to keep its manufacturing industry in check in order to not become 
reliant on commodity exports to China.  
A. CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINESE INVESTMENTS AND LOANS IN 
ARGENTINA 
Chinese investments, FDI, and loans are very complicated. Sources do not 
accurately portray where the lines are drawn between each, nor accurately reflect the data. 
However, this section explains what Chinese investment, in the forms of loans, traditional 
investment, and construction contracts, are taking place within Argentina. According to 
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Avendano et al., Argentina makes up nearly $28 billion or nearly 18% of total Chinese 
investments in South America. On the other hand, Chinese FDI to Argentina, between 
2003–2016 was only $5 billion.107 Argentina receives a large portion of their loans and 
contracts from China but Chinese FDI appears to be relatively low. 
As the Kirchner dynasty grew closer to China, between 2005–2014, Chinese 
investments amounted to $12 billion.108 Nearly half of that amount was invested in the 
energy sector, followed by $2.64 billion in transportation, and finally agriculture, with 
$1.86 billion invested. President Macri’s administration may have had some spillover from 
the Kirchners but he seemed to ramp up the Chinese investment as $15.62 billion was 
invested in a relatively short period: 2015–2017. During these three years, energy remained 
the largest investment sector, receiving $9.79 billion of investments. Transportation 
remained the second largest sector with $4.1 billion of investments. The third largest sector 
changed from agriculture to metals, as extractive industries received $960 million in 
investments. 
The World Bank estimates that Argentina’s net FDI inflow (current United States 
dollars (USD)) between 2005–2016, was a total of $88.599 billion.109 However, the World 
Bank does not breakdown the FDI by individual contributor country, which makes it 
extremely difficult to compare FDI flows solely from China. The American Enterprise 
Institution does have a very helpful database that tracks Chinese “investment and 
contracts,” which amounted to $17.7 billion between 2005–2016. This is equivalent to 
about 20% of Argentina’s total FDI inflows during that period although the two categories, 
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FDI versus “investment and contracts,” are not exactly the same but do provide a better 
understanding of the Sino-Argentina investment relationship.110  
The Kirchners’ investments and contracts with China, according to the China 
Global Investment Tracker, made up the equivalent of 17% of total FDI inflows from all 
countries between 2005–2014.111 On the other hand, the American Enterprise Institute 
claims that Chinese investments and contracts amounted to $5.39 billion between 2015–
2016 under Macri’s administration, while the World Bank reported a total of $15.019 
billion inward flow of FDI from all countries into Argentina during the same time period. 
When comparing these two databases, Chinese investment and contracts were equal to 35% 
of total FDI inflows to Argentina between 2015 and 2016, indicating a recent spike in 
Chinse investment.112 However, when comparing the American Enterprise Institute’s data 
with Santandertrade.com’s FDI data for Argentina, China does not even appear as a top 10 
contributor to Argentina’s FDI. Santander Trade is one of the only open sources providing 
FDI inputs by contributing country, which is why it was chosen to compare the data. 
Consequently, China is likely contributing more finances to Argentina than any other 
country as is seen by the relatively significant increase in Chinese “investment and 
contracts” provided by the American Enterprise Institute from 2015–2016.  
Santandertrade.com claims that Argentina’s top four largest FDI contributors in 
2016 were the United States, Spain, the Netherlands, and Brazil.113 The United States 
contributed $1.32 billion, Spain contributed $1.03, Netherlands contributed $689 million, 
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and Brazil contributed $344 million. Although China did not even register on 
Santanderrtrade.com’s top ten list of FDI investors, according to the American Enterprise 
Institute’s China Global Investment tracker, China contributed $1.13 billion to investment 
and contracts that same year—on par with U.S. FDI to the region. However, in 2017, 
Chinese investment and contracts jumped to $10.23 billion in a single year according to 
the China Global Investment Tracker. China National Nuclear invested $4.7 billion in the 
two nuclear projects, and the China Railway Construction Company (CRCC) invested $4 
billion into the railway systems, with other Chinese side investments in real estate, utilities, 
and metals.114 From these sources of data, it is evident that China plays a much larger 
investment role in Argentina than FDI data sources indicate, thus undermining China’s 
influence in the region. 
President Cristina Kirchner was the inaugural leader for pioneering Chinese 
investment in Argentina and she did not hesitate to bind the two countries together. Chinese 
investments have financed large infrastructure projects, aimed at increasing the health of 
the entire country as a whole. However, President Macri began his term being more hesitant 
to hastily move forward with all of the contracts but quickly jumped on board with 
increasing the strategic partnership.115 
Chinese investment by themselves are not the only financing taking place within 
Argentina. Figure 11 indicates the loans that Argentina received from China during 
President Cristina Kirchner’s terms in office—nearly all $15.3 billion came from the CDB. 
This illustrates best how China does business. The Chinese leadership makes strategic 
loans in regions of interest that have the energy, transportation, agriculture, and metals 
potential. Next, many of China’s national champions come in, after the two countries’ 
leadership have built strategic partnerships, to tie it all together through further investments 
made by Chinese state-owned enterprises. For example, on July 2010 a $10 billion loan 
was made by the CDB towards a railway system and seven years later after talks and loan 
placement, CRCC made a $2.4 billion construction contract to further complete the railway 
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system. Additionally, a pair of energy loans, for the amount of $2.7 billion, were made in 
2012 and 2014 by leadership of both countries and after the foundation was set, China 
National Nuclear came in with an additional $2.7 billion to fulfill the construction contract 
to build Chinese nuclear reactors. 
 
Figure 11.  Chinese Loans to Argentina.116 
As China saw how the World Bank was not willing to engage with Argentina after 
it defaulted shortly after the 2001 economic crisis, it filled the void with seven successive 
loans, totaling over $15 billion in just over a decade. Additionally, as of 2016, China has 
increased their loans to $25 billion. Besides the hydroelectric plants, nuclear facilities, and 
railroad upgrades, $1.8 billion is earmarked for the construction of natural gas pipelines, 
another $1.15 billion will be invested in solar panel projects, and another $360 million is 
allocated for aqueducts and road construction according to Elizabeth Ingram.117 The fact 
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that Argentina is deliberately expending much of the loans towards infrastructure projects, 
and the government has more democratic checks and balances in place to ensure 
transparency and accountability, produces circumstances for more promising development 
than Venezuela.  
Regardless of which sectors are utilizing the loans, Argentina still has to pay off 
the loans and they are not directly secured to resources as they are in Venezuela. Possibly 
excess electricity can be sold to Brazil instead of energy being subsidized to the domestic 
economy. Therefore, exporting energy, increasing higher quantities of agricultural 
products to be exported by train, and constructing more accessible and efficient 
transportation for Argentine workers, may increase Argentina’s ability to pay off the loans. 
If not, steadily high soy export tariffs—described later in the chapter—and unpopular 
austerity measures may have to be implemented. President Macri understands this 
dilemma, but has vowed to progressively lower tariffs as efficiency and productivity rises, 
in hopes of creating the fewest distortions. Hopefully, Chinese investment will not further 
entrench Argentina into a raw material exporter. If sound fiscal policy is implemented, the 
returns on investment will hopefully be significant enough to pay the principal and interest 
to meet Chinese financial contacts, while simultaneously lowering progressive export 
tariffs. 
Undoubtedly, China has become an increasingly large lender to the region with 
accompanying investment. As China has shipped nearly 3,000 train cars and associated 
rails, locomotives, engineers, and other attached goods, Argentina now has long task of 
paying down the debt. Chinese loans are repaid largely through export tariffs. President 
Macri hopes to double agricultural exports within four years as well as produce renewable 
energy and enter the shale gas revolution, while incurring more debt to slowly combat 
inflation and high levels of debt from the prior administration according to Charlie 
Devereux and Andres Martinez.118 However, there is very little literature on how Chinese 
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loans and investment have worked with Argentina, but the loan characteristics seem to be 
more consistent with traditional banking systems.  
B. CHINA’S INTERESTS IN ARGENTINA 
China is interested in Argentina due to its abundance of natural resources, including 
a significant amount of soy. China only has 8–10% of the world’s arable land but possesses 
20% of the world’s population. Therefore, China has a great demand for soybeans, which 
are used for animal feed, vegetable oil, and biodiesel. According to Gonzalo Paz, soy was 
almost nonexistent 20–25 years ago across the vast farmlands of Argentina, but as world 
food scarcity and energy security are on the rise, Argentina has been very innovative with 
its sustainable soy products to capitalize on those export opportunities.119 Therefore, 
soybean harvests have increased from 20 million hectares in 1960 to 120 million hectares 
in 2013 across the globe according to Maria Sly.120 Argentina is one of the great producers 
of soy and as of 2016, soy products constituted roughly 31% of Argentina’s export 
market.121 
China has further showed interest in Argentina’s agriculture as China’s largest 
farming company signed a $1.51 billion agreement to lease and develop 300,000 hectares 
in the Rio Negro province for a five- to 10-year period, according to Shane Romig122—
maintaining agricultural in China’s top three most heavily invested sectors in Argentina. 
Although China has a great demand for soy, it is extremely selective of what types of soy 
imports it purchases.  
In 2016, China imported 86% of Argentina’s plain soybeans, while purchasing 
fewer amounts of soy meal and oils year to year. For example, from 2003 to 2013—the 
                                                 
119 Gonzalo S. Paz, “Argentina and Asia: China’s Reemergence, Argentina’s Recovery,” 2014, 11, 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/UNCORRECTED%20PROOF-%20Paz.pdf. 
120 Maria Jose Haro Sly, “The Argentine Portion of the Soybean Commodity Chain,” Palgrave 
Communications 3 (September 26, 2017): 2. 
121 “Products Exported by Argentina (2016),” The Observatory of Economic Complexity, accessed 
February 2, 2018, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/arg/all/show/2016/. 
122 Shane Romig, “Hungry China Shops in Argentina,” Wall Street Journal, June 20, 2011, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303823104576391621352528138. 
 54 
duration of the entire China boom—China imported less than a half a percent of 
Argentina’s soy meal and since 2011, China has completely stopped buying soy meal. 
China chooses to import raw soybeans and build domestic grinding mills in China to 
provide its large population with domestic jobs, while simultaneously creating higher 
value-added production lines.  
China was originally drawn to Argentine soy oil and had been purchasing between 
10–30% of Argentine soy oil during the first 15 years of the 21st century. However, in 
2016, China, Argentina’s second largest trade partner after Brazil, only purchased .012% of 
all Argentine soy oil. This indicated China’s new domestic capability of making the higher 
value-added product on its own. 
Regardless of China’s actions, Argentina remains extremely reliant on vegetable 
and animal product exports to China—mainly soybean exports, which reached 
$2.79 billion in 2016—while China is much less reliant on mineral products, textiles, and 
chemical product imports.123 Those higher value-added products are to be produced by 
China to sell for a gain on the world market.  
 Additionally, China finds Argentina to be attractive because the anti-U.S. Kirchner 
regime welcomed financing since most Western banks would not provide them with 
funding since prior loans were still outstanding. This was an opportunity for China to attach 
its loans to infrastructure projects and further investment opportunities in the region. These 
loans came with clauses that utilize China’s largest state-owned enterprises or “national 
champions” to provide the materials, expertise, and future supply chains to maintain the 
finished product. For example, Argentina’s $2.4 billion railway modernization loan with 
China is attached to the CRCC, which is providing the railway materials, train cars, and 
diesel locomotives to accomplish the project. It does not give Argentina the option of using 
the loan to pursue other foreign railway companies—or even domestic ones—to complete 
the task.  
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China is able to make long-term loans because it knows that its own state-owned 
enterprises will likely profit from the projects. The infrastructure loan will provide markets 
for Chinese exports in the present, and into the future, as parts will likely be purchased 
from Chinese railcar manufacturers as the Argentine railways are maintained over the 
years. Keith Barrow states that the CRCC will supply 3,509 Chinese train cars and 107 
Chinese diesel locomotives to Argentina per a contract signed in December 2014.124 
Argentina has already received 2,963 wagons as of May 2017, showing the rapid 
turnaround from contract to delivery.  
The railway modernization loan is a $2.4 billion project to upgrade the 930-mile 
Belgrano Cargas rail system, or “Train to the Clouds,” that traverses the Andes Mountains 
and crosses into Chile. This railway system would further link Argentina to the Chilean 
port of Antofagasta, and would be a quick exit point for Argentine exports to reach the 
Chinese market from the Pacific Ocean. Currently exports travel southward around Cape 
Horn from the Atlantic Ocean and on to China according to Luke Patey.125 Another line, 
the San Martin Line, will be upgraded to increase its 2.3 million ton capacity to 13 million 
tons by 2024, claims Barrow.126 This will increase potential shipments of agricultural 
products by over five and half times. Additionally, future resources inside the vast lands of 
Argentina will be more easily accessible as the region is further developed and linked to 
roads, railways, and ports. 
The Chinese have also provided Argentina with nuclear technologies to further 
create energy independence for Argentina and have contracts to build a pair of Chinese 
nuclear reactors. China currently has four nuclear companies and it appears that the state 
may try to consolidate them into another national champion. Wan Gang, President of the 
China Institute of Atomic Energy, stated, “We need a single well known Chinese nuclear 
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brand which can compete with international brands like Areva and Westinghouse.”127 This 
would be the first Chinese nuclear reactor of its kind in Latin America and possibly the 
beginning of many more projects to come in the region.  
Overall, China’s ambitions are to provide new financing opportunities to Latin 
America. These finance opportunities come packaged with massive projects such as the 
railway modernization project, nuclear reactor production, as well as the largest Chinese 
dams to be built outside of China: a reflection of China’s Three Gorges Dam, which is 
home to the largest hydroelectric power generation station in the world. Every piece of the 
deal is linked to the Chinese communist party through oversight of the CDB’s funds, its 
state-owned enterprises, and diplomatic relations. These initiatives help promote the 
Chinese model as they have become the largest lender to South America.  
C. ARGENTINA’S INTERESTS IN CHINA 
Bretton Woods institutions began cutting off financial ties with Argentina after 
Argentina defaulted twice in the 21st century, once in 2001 after its economic crisis and 
again in 2014. This led President Nestor Kirchner and his wife, and political successor, 
President Cristina Kirchner to form the Sino-Argentina relationship. President Cristina 
Kirchner intensified ties with Venezuela and other anti-American establishments during 
her two terms. Her administration focused on obtaining infrastructure and energy 
diversification loans in hopes of lowering energy costs and creating better transportation 
for the average Argentine.  
Near the end of her term in 2013, she raced to complete a loan agreement to have 
the Chinese build two hydroelectric dams—the largest within Argentina’s borders as well 
as China’s largest dam project attempted outside of China, claims Patey128—to increase its 
energy independence. Juan Cardenal states that in her last months in office, she had more 
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than 30 signed memorandums of understandings signed between Argentina and China.129 
She also subsidized the cost of electricity for citizens due to high energy costs and poor 
electrical infrastructure, which resulted in the depletion of Argentina’s foreign exchange 
reserves, according to Miner.130 The CDB was willing to fund $4.7 billion for the dams 
back in 2014, as other sources of credit were not willing to make large investments in the 
region due to the aftermath of the severe recession in 2001.131 This initiative would bring 
thousands of jobs to the state of Santa Cruz where critics said she has many family and 
political ties.  
On the other hand, the two-mile-wide dam would flood grasslands the size of 
Buenos Aires and environmental concerns had been raised. Many were worried that 
Chinese workers would flood the region, but only 150 Chinese engineers have been 
estimated as potentially working on the project—making up only 4% of total employees, 
according to Jonathan Watts.132 Once President Macri was elected, he placed a hold on the 
project to allow the Supreme Court to reassess the project and environmental impacts. 
However, as of summer 2017 the project has been allowed to continue for reasons to be 
explained in further detail later in this chapter. However, he recognizes the need to update 
the energy sector to increase efficiency and reduce energy costs over the long-term—thus 
ridding the country of energy subsidies. 
The Argentines have been lured by the extensive Chinese nuclear offer because the 
Chinese would finance the project, transfer nuclear construction technology, source 50–70 
percent of the components (eliminating reliance on multiple countries for parts), and 
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provide 100% of the civil works needed, according to Charles Newbery.133 Western 
nuclear companies do not have the means to finance such large projects in developing 
regions and likely keep a tighter hold on intellectual property rights. Additionally, Santiago 
Miret claims that Argentina has not prioritized growth in the nuclear sector since the 
military dictatorships, but with enticing Chinese loans, it completed its third reactor in 
2012.134 Argentina now relies on nuclear energy for 10% of its energy generation 
capability, with plans for three more reactors and two of those to be constructed by the 
Chinese.135 
If the Sino-Argentine nuclear relationship evolves, Argentina plans to be a nuclear 
hub for Chinese supply in Latin America. According to the World Nuclear Association, 
“[China and Argentina are] establishing a joint strategic partnership for the purpose of 
developing and building nuclear reactors in Latin America, so that Argentina becomes a 
Latin American technology platform, supplying countries with nuclear technology 
incorporating Chinese goods and services.”136 This could potentially benefit both 
economies as their supply chains and expertise intertwine and connect with other countries 
of Latin America. 
President Macri has been known for denouncing Venezuela, paying back debts to 
the United States, and aligning more with U.S. interests. Although President Macri began 
his presidency questioning Chinese loans and contracts concerning the dam construction, 
he seems to be supportive of the nuclear and infrastructure rehabilitation projects. Barrow 
states that in May 2017, he visited Beijing and signed another agreement to increase the 
$2.4 billion initial investment towards the railway upgrades by another $1.6 billion to 
further speed up deliveries and connect the vast farmlands to the ports.137 These 
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infrastructure initiatives seem to be benefiting the agricultural industry’s exports. However, 
Argentina is de-industrializing as it is becoming more dependent on Chinese industrial 
imports while exporting higher quantities of agricultural products—mostly basic soy 
exports. 
D. ARGENTINA’S GOVERNMENT DRIVEN BY SOY TAXATION 
Chinese loans to Argentina are highly invested in infrastructure and paid for 
through taxation—much different than the loans-for-resources in Venezuela. This is likely 
one reason why President Cristina Kirchner dramatically increased export tariffs on soy in 
2008, to be able to pay for incurred Chinese loans that began in 2007. For example, in 2016, 
63% of Argentina’s exports to China were soybean based products and only 8.5% were 
crude oil exports.138 Most of the land in Argentina is privately owned so a new popular 
way for the state to produce income, to pay back its loans, was to increase tax on soy 
exports.  
Argentina’s tax system plays a key role in affecting the dynamics of Chinese loans. 
For example, Venezuela’s loans-for-oil provide the government with funding in return for 
a pre-arranged quantity of oil shipments per month, while Venezuela pays down the 
principal and interest with each shipment of oil, at previously agreed upon price ranges. In 
Argentina, the loans are more orthodox, in the sense that the funds are received by the 
government, utilized per the contracts, and paid back however Argentina decides to—
mainly through taxation and trade revenue. Due to the fact that China has a high demand 
for soy, and Argentina’s local economy does not, soy tax rates are more easily taxed at a 
much higher rate than other commodities being exported from the country. If the export 
tax rates were equally high for all products, Argentine citizens would be more likely to buy 
the domestic products due to tariffs insulating domestic prices. However, Argentine’s are 
not seeking to buy soy so the government can hike the taxes on soy easier than other 
products. 
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Between 2003 and 2007, the Argentine government imposed a 23.5% export tariff 
on soy, which seemed to revive the economy from the 2001 financial crisis, according to 
Dowd.139 However, due to President Nestor Kirchner’s “export-oriented populism,” he 
increased soy tariffs to 27.5% in January 2007, and again increased them to 35% in 
November 2007—just in time for elections.140 Furthermore, government spending 
increased more than 54% from 2006 to 2007 as public works and social security spending 
dramatically rose, supporting the populist movements. Interestingly, the first Chinese loan 
was also made in 2007 for “export sector development,” to speed up the government’s 
ability to export larger quantities of soy. This enabled China to receive more soy and 
facilitated a way for the populist government to further boost tax revenue.  
The actions of Argentina’s government were similar to Venezuela’s, as government 
programs increased to appease the lower classes, while using the proceeds of the 
government’s cash cow—in this case soy export taxes—to fund the programs. Dowd 
claims that critics found President Cristina Kirchner’s tax rates to be excessive, as she 
implemented a soy tax system that dramatically raised soy taxes as soon as she came into 
power in March 2008.141 She increased export taxes to 44.1% on soy and the additional 
revenue was used as a political tool to build support from the poor and much of the working 
class. By this time, the Kirchner dynasty believed that they did not need the farmers’ votes 
to remain in power and thus radically increased the soy export taxes.  
Although the farmers’ political votes may not have been important, their voices and 
actions were. The populist government did not realize the power that the landowners, 
farmers, and associates had as the agricultural sector began protesting the government’s 
44.1% export tax. The rural citizens wanted to negotiate a 35% tax instead, and did so by 
shutting down production and soy exports to force the government, and their urban 
supporters, to negotiate. For example, as export tariffs skyrocketed, farmers were furious 
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and began stockpiling their grain, causing shipments to stop and city protests were 
launched against President Fernandez de Kirchner’s reforms. The middle class feared 
another economic crisis similar to that of 2001, so they took to the streets with pots and 
pans, in hopes of pressuring government leaders to lower tax burdens on the agricultural 
sector. This would give farmers the incentive to supply the markets with soy again, which 
would employ the working class again, increase tax revenue, and stabilize Argentina—the 
world’s third largest soy exporter. On the other hand, government supporters were told the 
farmers were causing inflation, poor wages, and that developments would exacerbate to 
problems witnessed in 2001, if soy exports were not further taxed. Argentina’s congress 
came together in June 2008 to legitimize the 44.1% tax rate but congress voted 37–36 in 
favor of the 35% tax rate demanded by the farmers.142 
Taxation was key for allowing citizens to mobilize, as perceptions of unjust reforms 
were taking place, and allowing their voice to be heard. Farmers’ voices were heard in 
protests and kept a check on Argentina’s populist government as soy was unfairly taxed at 
a much higher rate than any other export. These democratic features have enabled 
Argentina to maintain balance by preventing the government from overstepping its bounds, 
as has happened in Venezuela. 
Since President Macri was elected, $33 billion in investment has come from the 
United States, Germany, Canada, Spain, and Brazil.143 Additionally, Argentina made the 
top of the list of Fortune magazine’s best markets of 2017, as Argentina’s MERVAL Index, 
a portfolio of 28 well-known companies from the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange, reached 
a 45% run-up.144 It is likely that increased foreign investment, as well as diversification of 
the source of investment, has led to the large growth starting in 2014 and rapidly increasing 
from 2015 to through 2017. Macri’s business background and nearly neo-liberal approach 
has helped transformed Argentina’s economy from the populist government of the 
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Kirchners that spanned most of the 21st century. Argentina has paid back past debtors and 
is once again welcoming foreign investment from all parts of the globe. 
Although President Macri has helped foreign investment competition return to 
Argentina, he has not cut important financial ties with China. He assured China in 2016 
that they wanted to continue bilateral ties with China to continue hydroelectric dam 
projects, continue talks of a $1.5 billion nuclear plant, and finish a Chinese satellite 
communication station—not claimed to be military related—in Patagonia (which is now 
operational).145 However, he has decreased taxes on soy and hopes to further decrease 
tariffs as the economy becomes healthier.  
E. EFFECTS OF CHINESE INVESTMENT IN ARGENTINA 
Chinese investment has created a “Commodity Consensus” instead of a 
“Washington Consensus.” Sly states that many authors use the phrase Commodity 
Consensus because the Chinese relationship is “completely based on neo-extractivist 
activities, enormous commercial asymmetries, the loss of food sovereignty, and 
environmental degradation, among other factors.”146 As President Cristina Kirchner further 
increased Argentina’s dependence on China, Argentine exports to China grew 156% from 
2003 to 2007, in contrast to China’s 886% export growth with Argentina. Additionally, 
Argentina’s trade deficit has grown over 700% with China from 2008 to 2014, which was 
the same period that Argentina began taking on significant debt with China, indicating the 
linkages to Chinese products as the loans were incurred. Argentina has become more of an 
agricultural peripheral appendage to the Chinese industrial core as more reliance on 
primary products—soy and crude oil—have risen, and higher value-added exports, such as 
Argentina’s prized soy oil, have decreased. 
The nuclear deals have come with strings attached as most Chinese projects do. For 
example, in May 2017 both countries signed a nuclear cooperation agreement that China 
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would supply Argentina with two nuclear reactors, valued at $15 billion and China willing 
to provide loans for 85% of the projects. Although Argentina does not pose a nuclear threat, 
China once again is increasing its influence and furthering its own economic agenda in the 
region. For every Chinese nuclear reactor exported, thousands of units of specialized 
equipment will be needed to maintain them, and hundreds of industries will be needed to 
manufacture and construct the facilities. This is calculated to produce 150,000 new jobs 
for Chinese industries that will export the specialized parts, tools, and expertise to 
Argentina. Furthermore, investments totaling RMB 100 billion throughout the life of the 
reactor will be generated for the Chinese economy. This could be very lucrative for China 
if nuclear projects in Argentina are successful and transfer to other South American 
countries. Chinese manufactures will likely benefit, but Argentine manufacturing will 
likely be less favorably impacted. However, many jobs will be produced for South 
Americans if they have the required skill sets and make the proper agreements with China 
to hire their own labor and produce significant portions of the supplies domestically. 
Soybeans remain the staple that keeps China and Argentina held together. However, 
Argentina once exported soybean oil and soy meal to China, which is a higher value-added 
product than raw soybeans. Now China has replaced Argentine soybean oil and soy meal 
with its own domestically created soybean oil and soy meal crushed and processed from 
Argentina’s raw soybeans. This is a prime example of the erosion of Argentina’s soy value 
chain. As China boosts its own soy industry back home, it reduces demand for Argentina’s 
soy mills and soy oil plants, thus making Argentina more reliant on raw materials.  
Additionally, Sly claims that China also posed 9% tariffs on soy oil imports to 
artificially raise the price of Argentine soy oil to allow their domestic soy oil production to 
grow and develop.147 Furthermore, she states, “Although [soy] exports increased 84% in 
terms of volume from 2012 to 2015 [to China], the income in millions of dollars for the 
same period was 30%.” This is due to the volatility of commodity prices. Although 
Argentine train car tonnage has increased, Argentina now has to export nearly three times 
as much soy—at current soy prices—to generate the same amount of revenue due to 
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commodity price vulnerability and soy value chain erosion. This is problematic because 
President Macri wants to double soy exports within four years, but that initiative would not 
even increase revenue if commodity prices stay low as they did from 2012 to 2015. 
Despite China’s impressive loans with Argentina, the Sino-Argentina relations 
have not always been great. Gallagher mentions that Argentina’s shoe industry, which 
consists of 600,000 employees, felt the pressure from China’s low cost shoe imports and 
in 2009, Argentina initiated an anti-dumping case against China.148 In turn, China increased 
shoe exports to Argentina to further decrease the cost of shoes and cause Argentina’s shoe 
industry to not be able to compete at such low prices. Argentina fired back with high tariffs 
on Chinese shoes for five years. China did not back down and knew that Argentina was 
reliant on soybean exports to China—since it imports 77% of Argentina’s soybeans and 
Argentina’s populist government is reliant on high progressive export tax on soy to fund 
popular programs and keep taxes lower for the working class. Therefore, China reduced 
Argentine soy imports by 65%, so that only 12% of Argentine soy was being imported by 
China, thus crippling Argentine farmers and government revenue. Finally, President 
Cristina Kirchner caved and traveled to China to discuss further developmental plans that 
would further indebtedness and linkages to Chinese funds for a railroad modernization 
program (Figure 11 shows the two loans for train projects, which were signed in July 2010 
during the same visit to China).  
This is a classic case of geoeconomics, as China attacked Argentina’s primary 
export—soy—to achieve its goal of exporting low cost products, while protecting and 
boosting its own industries, while other countries’ high value-added industries are further 
weakened. This is a foreshadowing of what countries can expect if they attempt to push 
back against China, who is not about to ratchet back its activity worldwide. As Leslie Gelb 
states, “Beijing has been playing the new economic game at a maestro level, staying out of 
wars and political confrontations and zeroing in on business—its global influence far 
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exceeds its existing economic strength. Nations do not fear China’s military might; they 
fear its ability to give or withhold trade and investments.”149  
President Macri finds himself in a difficult dilemma. He must work with China to 
keep it from withdrawing funding and construction efforts to complete their $20 billion 
contracts for railroads, dams, and two nuclear plants. For example, President Macri thought 
that he could count on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) to create new deals for 
Argentina with countries such as the United States, Japan, Singapore, Canada, and 
others,so he made a bold move and halted construction of two controversial dams in Santa 
Cruz. China in return said that there was a cross-default clause that if one project is stopped, 
all projects would stop. Furthermore, China began buying less soy to bring Argentina to 
the negotiating table. President Macri then flew to Beijing, reversed his hardline decision 
to halt dam construction and further entangled Sino-Argentina relations by signing 16 
additional Chinese investment deals.150 As Macri has tried to cut ties with China, and align 
more with European and American markets and investment, China has been able to use its 
soft power to maintain deep financial integration. 
As Argentina’s government has shifted from a populist regime to a more liberal and 
outward-oriented market, China continues to remain extremely important for Argentina. 
President Macri was the first non-Peronist, non-radical Argentine president to be elected 
since 1916.151 He attempted to push back against Chinese investment but shortly found that 
there was not as much maneuvering room as he had hoped as China’s cross-default clause 
threatened to end all projects, if he cancelled the dam construction. President Macri was 
not willing to forfeit all projects—especially the improved and expanded rail system—over 
the questionable hydroelectric dams. 
Argentina has been able to pull itself out of a severe financial crisis, pay back 
defaulted loans, and is making great strides to return to its prominence that it achieved at 
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the turn of the 20th century. It is too early to tell precisely how Chinese energy 
diversification investments have benefited Argentina, but the 930 new miles of railway and 
quintupling of cargo capacity, indicate that infrastructure development has benefited 
Argentina. It is the linkage between railway modernization that allows more soy, 
construction materials, and minerals to quickly reach ports and construction sites, thus 
increasing soy export taxes, and expediting Chinese-led construction efforts. 
Therefore, it seems that Chinese investment is not a guarantor for successful 
economic development but rather dependent on the recipient country’s institutions. 
Douglass North defines institutions as “humanly developed constraints that structure 
political, economic, and social interaction.”152 As with most successful development 
transitions, strong institutions have been the key factor for growth, development, and 
equality. Argentina has had relatively strong democratic institutions in place that have 
highly scrutinized economic planning, to ensure that citizens do not go through another 
crisis similar to that of 2001. Although still imperfect institutions, free elections have 
allowed Argentina to turn the corner from a 12-year populist rule to a center-right 
administration, ensuring that no single party dominates the political scene for an excessive 
period, thus increasing opportunities for corruption.  
F. CONCLUSION 
The new administration has questioned Chinese projects and has diversified its 
investments with several countries, limiting China’s footprint. Additionally, Argentina has 
used tax revenue to pay debt, which is completely different from Venezuela’s oil rents 
funding the government. The progressive tax on soy exports was the key driver in 
Argentina’s case and seemed to be a plausible way to stay on top of debt payments, while 
preventing the government from having a monopoly over revenue--such as Venezuela and 
PDVSA. This gives farmers incentives to find ways to produce more to create larger profit 
margins, whereas Venezuela’s oil industry workers have little to no incentive to ensure 
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rigs, refineries, and tankers are kept in good working condition to increase profits, since 
PDVSA is not a private firm and nobody owns property rights to any part of the company.  
In the case of Argentina, landowners and farmers have leverage to influence the 
affairs of soy taxation through lobbying, implementing strikes, and storing soy when 
conditions are unfavorable—thus cutting off soy revenues from the state—if the state’s 
actions are seen as abusive or corrupt or if commodity prices are deemed too low. 
Therefore, Chinese investment has not caused negative secondary issues by funding 
corrupt government officials. At times, excessive soy taxation has occurred to increase 
revenue for the country to meet debt obligations and fuel social programs. However, the 
voice of the people have been able to keep a proper balance in check. 
President Macri has bargained well with FDI from many Western countries that 
have invested 35% of FDI into manufacturing,153 bringing capital back to Argentina. This 
creates a complex diversification of capital with a competitive component to it that has the 
potential to unlock great economic growth if the foreign investment creates new domestic 
technology and if it creates new or expanded industry to Argentina. Overall, China appears 
to have the same strategic partnership with Macri’s non-populist administration that it had 
with the Kirchners’, although Macri’s administration seems to have added some safety nets 
to ensure a proper blend of foreign investment diversification. This has likely decreased 
China’s soft power—at least during Macri’s administration—but Sino-Argentine policies 
seem to have remained unchanged and indicate that China is able to penetrate any form of 
regime in South America. 
Chinese investment has been improving Argentina’s railways, which will 
ultimately increase the ability to transfer goods from the state’s interior to distant markets 
at a lower cost, as well as provide better transportation for Argentine workers. It is too early 
to see how investment in nuclear plants and hydroelectric dams will affect the country. If 
Argentina’s stock market remains strong throughout the construction of the large projects, 
they will likely finish with much success. Lower energy prices will likely result as well as 
opportunities to sell energy to Brazil.  
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Ultimately, Chinese investment can be beneficial for any country as long as good 
governance occurs. It is when corrupt officials began unwinding democratic processes, 
fueled by Chinese loans, that the foreign countries and their citizens can become vulnerable 
to Chinese investment. Argentina is mostly benefiting from Chinese investment but a 
greater amount of emphasis should be placed on the deterioration of manufacturing jobs. 
Argentina needs to ensure that Chinese investment highly involves local companies, while 
building these projects to ensure additional jobs are created domestically, while learning 
best practices from Chinese firms. 
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V. SOUTH AMERICA’S GRAVITATION TO THE CHINESE 
ORBIT: WHAT CAN THE UNITED STATES DO? 
“Who else was there to hold the line against the authoritarians who 
otherwise would have dominated that century? Who else is there now, at the 
beginning of the twenty first? 
—John Lewis Gaddis 
 “Today China is getting a foothold in Latin America. It is using economic 
statecraft to pull the region into its orbit; the question is at what price?” 
—U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, 2018 
This chapter illustrates U.S. foreign investment losses in South America compared 
with China’s growth in the region. Additionally, it discusses the U.S. National Defense 
Strategy as it relates to creating allies in the Western Hemisphere while maintaining 
strategic advantages. Finally, the chapter portrays the urgent need for a Good Neighbor 
Policy for the 21st century to implement proactive policies in the region. Initiatives for 
leaders to present at the two summits held in the Americas in 2018 are also presented. One 
initiative would be to advocate for a “Power America” movement. This would be similar 
to the “Power Africa” initiative implemented by the Obama administration in 2013 and 
that continues to this day but would focus resources on our closest neighbors. These 
initiatives need to be developed with the inclusion of the needs of South American 
countries but should focus efforts on providing incentives for reducing corruptive, criminal, 
gang, and drug trafficking activities. No better time exists than now to develop these 
initiatives, as “the year of the Americas” is unfolding with the G20 and G7 summits taking 
place this year in Buenos Aires and Quebec, respectively. 
A. MIXED RESULTS FROM CHINESE INVESTMENT DUE TO 
INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS 
As South America has built new partnerships with China over the past decade and 





helped many cash-strapped countries find alternative funding that Bretton Woods 
institutions would not provide or that demanded excessive changes by the recipient 
country. Throughout the first decade of the 21st century, Chinese financing gave left-
leaning governments opportunities to distance themselves from Washington politics. The 
Chinese commodity boom provided a new windfall of revenue for these governments, as 
well as inexpensive Chinese products that have been more accessible to the typical South 
American citizen.  
These new Sino-South American ties have created secondary effects that have 
further changed South America. For example, Venezuela’s socialist regime has used the 
funds to advance its political agenda. This has empowered and benefited the regime but 
has negatively affected millions of citizens as the regime has become more authoritative.  
Given increased investment by China, other South American countries are likely to 
experience similar effects. If citizens maintain their voice and are given the rights and 
liberties that they believe are warranted, to control where investments are used, then 
Chinese ties can be beneficial. If, on the other hand, poor institutions use loosely managed 
Chinese financing to drive power-seeking initiatives, then increased debt, coupled with 
corrupt practices, will likely lead those countries down a road to disaster. The Chinese 
simply want their contracted share of resources and are not concerned with how foreign 
countries manage their domestic affairs—even if those countries become significantly 
oppressive as Venezuela has demonstrated.  
Although Chinese investment may contribute to distortions in debtor countries’ 
financial affairs and therefore affect those countries’ institutions, another concern is that 
Chinese investment does not focus on the manufacturing industry of South America. As 
Gallagher mentions in his studies, the China boom was a commodity export boom for Latin 







region fell from 60% to 35% in 2015. During the China boom, 2003 to 2013, 78% of Latin 
America’s manufacturing industry was not able to compete with the products of equivalent 
Chinese firms.154 Furthermore, it is frightening to note that extractive industries only 
employ 11.6 people per $1 million in exports, while manufacturing jobs employ 
71.8 people per $1 million of exports. This is exactly where Latin America is losing. Dilma 
Rousseff, former president of Brazil, spoke of relations between China and Brazil as 
needing to evolve “beyond complementarity.”155 There are fewer job opportunities in 
commodity sectors—China’s predominant imports—while the Chinese focus on selling 
“low cost” manufactured goods to Latin Americans. This ensures job security for the 
Chinese while almost imperceptibly eroding the manufacturing industry and future job 
opportunities for Latin Americans. 
B. MARKETS, INVESTMENTS, AND RELATIONS INCREASINGLY AT 
STAKE FOR THE UNITED STATES  
If the United States is to remain the partner of choice in South America, policy-
makers need to understand what the United States is losing out on and refocus efforts on 
shoring up relations to remedy the losses. Figure 12 portrays how China has become a 
substitute for U.S. investment in South America. It is evident that the CDB is already 
outpacing U.S. foreign investment in the region because it has more foreign investment 
stock in South America than the United States has.  
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Figure 12.  Chinese vs. U.S. Investment in South America (2016)—U.S. $ Billions.156 
This data illustrates the rapid growth and influence that Chinese investment is 
achieving in the region as Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela already have 
more investments from China than the United States. Additionally, Chinese investment 
stock in South America is currently under $140 billion while China has pledged over $250 
billion in investment in Latin America by 2025, according to Miner.157 This suggests that 
further investment opportunities will be presented over the next several years. Correlating 
with this increase in investment are the linkages of trade and commerce, where China is 
also dominating trade around the globe—with growing influence in Asia and Africa and 
edging its way further into the Middle East, Western Europe, and now South America. 
Figure 13 shows how the United States continues to hold 7 out of 12 majority market shares 
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in trade in South America as of early 2016, but that will likely change as China continues 
to dominate world markets. 
 
Figure 13.  The World’s #1 Trade Partner: China.158 
The Chinese are slowly chipping away at footholds the United States once held. 
The remaining countries that the United States is vulnerable to losing out on additional 
trade opportunities—as China crowds it out—are Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, 
and Venezuela. They will all likely begin increasing trade with China due to increased 
investment ties with China, which often come with strings attached in the form of 
development projects for resource quotas. According to Blackwill et al., “as certain states 
come to employ geo-economic tools, it can change not only the nature of diplomacy but 
that of markets as well.”159 For this reason, analyzing imports and exports to better 
understand how China has influenced South America may show where the United States 
is losing soft power.  
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From 2005 to 2017, China accrued $156.44 billion of investments in South America 
alone—$175.72 billion if the tally includes all of Latin America and the Caribbean.160 
Additionally, China loaned South America $146.65 billion between 2005 and 2017—
$150.41 billion including Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean.161 Although data 
for U.S. FDI flows to the region are not available, Figure 14 shows the narrowing gap 
between Chinese and U.S. FDI outflows on a global scale. Chinese outflows are rising 
much more significantly than U.S. FDI outflows, and there is no reason to believe that 
South America would be an exception to the trend. 
 
Figure 14.  Chinese vs. U.S. Global FDI Inflows and Outflows.162 
C. U.S. NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY’S NEED FOR A GOOD 
NEIGHBOR POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 
Current U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis understands the need to act in the 
Western Hemisphere. In the 2018 National Defense Strategy, he stated that the United 
States must maintain long-term security cooperation with its allies, with an emphasis on 
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“sustaining advantages in the Western Hemisphere.” He stated further that “the U.S. 
derives immense benefit from a stable, peaceful hemisphere that reduces security threats 
to the homeland. Supporting the U.S. interagency lead, the Department will deepen its 
relations with regional countries that contribute military capabilities to shared regional and 
global security challenges.”163 However, the United States is currently not viewed highly 
by Latin America and many barriers need to be removed before this can easily be 
accomplished. 
Relations with South America have not always been great, but the United States 
has been able to meet its strategic objectives on many different occasions. For example, 
shortly after the Great Depression and prior to World War II, one way the United States 
gained alliances and increased investment in Latin America was for the U.S. government 
to implement the Good Neighbor Policy. The United States was able to develop a positive 
relationship with Latin America through the focused efforts of U.S. President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt in the 1930s when he delivered his Good Neighbor Policy address. It began as 
rhetoric in 1933, but was quickly backed by actions, as the U.S. government recognized its 
poor relations with Latin America as well as its need to solidify the Western Hemisphere 
against the Axis powers during World War II.  
The speech led to a U.S. hands-off policy, which was enticing to Latin America 
because it was given “a share” of both authority in decision making as well as more shares 
of wealth from U.S. private owned businesses abroad, according to David Green.164 By 
1939, it had transformed Western Hemisphere relations: a climate that prevailed until the 
death of Roosevelt 12 years later, as noted by Edward Guerrant.165 Language from a simple 
speech, backed by reformed political actions, became tangible reality as the Roosevelt 
administration bound itself to non-intervention even if it felt obligated to aid American 
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citizens and to combat nationalism, which was severely tested when President Lázaro 
Cárdenas of Mexico nationalized the nation’s oil industry and seized the assets of several 
U.S. oil companies, and the U.S. military did not retaliate with force or coercion.166 
Roosevelt initiated the Good Neighbor Policy to mend U.S. relations with Latin 
America and to build mutual trust and cooperation in Latin America as a means to help 
overcome the Axis powers. The United States and South America do not currently have 
any mutual extra-hemispheric threats to aid Western Hemispheric unification as was the 
case during World War II, when South America allied with the United States to combat the 
Germans and Japanese advances. However, in light of America’s tarnished image in the 
region, there is a compelling need for mending relations and increasing cooperation to 
achieve mutual success in the Western Hemisphere. As Walter Mead stated, “there are real 
reasons to hope that Americans will rise to the dizzying and daunting challenges of the 
twenty-first century. . . . Our ignorance of our own past successes impoverishes our foreign 
policy process today.”167 
To rebuild the Good Neighbor relationship—for the sake of the United States 
remaining a significant player in the affairs of Latin America and benefiting from trade, 
investment, and hemispheric security—U.S. policy may need to pivot toward the interests 
of South America. This includes avoiding replication of past failures and contributing 
something more than China currently has to offer the region. In the past, this relationship 
enabled all of Latin America to come together (even, after fervent effort, Argentina) to 
overcome the Great Depression while jointly combating the evils of World War II. Evident 
today are similar opportunities for increased cooperation and mutual economic growth and 
development.  
Returning to these same ideas of cooperation and respect could be a solution to 
enable the United States to return to the South American fold of trust and to push back 
against Chinese influence in the Western Hemisphere. Consequently, the U.S. government 
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may need to focus on “nation branding” to develop a better image of the U.S. government 
to more effectively market U.S. trade, investment, and influence among South American 
countries. Christopher Browning and Antonio Ferraz de Oliveira describe the term “nation 
branding” as a form of nation building, similar to the efforts of Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor 
Policy, that attempt to market a nation through good governance and policy around the 
world to entice others to engage in economic activity.168 This idea would suggest that the 
United States could build an appealing label to promote itself better and to sell the “U.S. 
brand” to South America once again. 
The United States may be able to adopt nation branding or a modernized Good 
Neighbor Policy to create among South Americans a new, better image of the United 
States, enabling it to compete with China in the Western Hemisphere. Respect, 
collaboration, and a willingness to reach mutually beneficial agreements go a long way 
toward ensuring that prosperity and security grows in the Western Hemisphere. This may 
be the only way to achieve Secretary Mattis’s objective of “maintaining favorable regional 
balances of power in the . . .Western Hemisphere.”169 
D. APPROACHES THE UNITED STATES CAN IMPLEMENT TO CREATE 
A GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY 
The United States government finds itself in a difficult situation as China is gaining 
an economic advantage in South America, and Latin America’s approval rating of 
President Trump stands at 16%, according to Miner.170 Given that negativity, the United 
States has at least a couple of options. First, the United States can take a passive role in the 
region and give South American countries the room they needed for self-determination. 
Second, the United States can take an active role to reshape relations. The active role would 
have many options within it, but to gain long-term allies and establish successful security 
cooperatives, it is essential to achieve buy-in from South American countries. 
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1. Passive Role 
If the United States plays a passive role in the region the result might be a larger 
foothold in the region for China. On the other hand, if China does not reform its South 
America trade policies, the Sino-South American strategic partnership may lead to similar 
failed relationships between the region and the United States. For example, South 
American countries typically remained at the periphery of the U.S. core, leading to path 
dependency as U.S. companies typically benefited from raw materials to feed their higher 
value-added industries. This same mercantilist pattern is taking shape between China and 
the countries of South America. According to Miner, China is in truth more protectionist 
than the United States, but the rhetoric from Latin America would suggest the opposite.171  
Therefore, a plausible option for U.S. leadership is simply to say nothing about 
Sino-South American relations and allow South American countries to follow their own 
paths with China. In the meantime, the United States could focus on improving relations 
with Mexico. If the results of a liberal democracy—rule of law and individual rights—lead 
to superior results than those of an authoritarian global power, it is only a matter of time 
before South America will turn back to the United States to rebuild mutually beneficial 
political-economic ties.  
For favorable relations to develop with any of Latin America, however, the United 
States must prevent protectionism from disenfranchising Latin America. The United States 
can implement protectionism against unbalanced trade relationships, but it is not in the best 
interests of the United States to repel its southern neighbors through overly aggressive 
rhetoric, let alone protectionist actions. If protectionism is to be used, it needs to be directed 
at specific regimes so that all countries do not feel threatened. 
The United States should reflect on foreign policy failures in Cuba, from 1898 
through the Cuban revolution ending in 1961. As William Williams alludes, “American 
policy interacted with the politics of the Cuban coalition in a way that strengthened the 
radicals. It probably also pushed them much further to the left than they had originally 
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hoped or intended to go.”172 He further explains that it was not merely the Cuban 
revolutionaries who mobilized Cuban citizens to revolt, but it was also the United States’ 
failure to properly use its power in the region and U.S. actions helped propel the revolution.  
The United States should avoid further alienating the people of South America. 
However, it may easily be swayed by political revolutions if the United States’ power 
continues to be negatively viewed in the region. Results from the Cold War in Latin 
America show that the U.S. containment of the Soviet Union in Latin America yielded 
long-lasting consequences. For example, Cuban relations remain very cold to this day, 
because the United States spent years courting anti-communist dictatorships while 
simultaneously conducting covert operations to overthrow regimes with sympathetic 
communist ties. Additionally, the United States did not use its power to build up Cuba the 
way it had built and reinforced its own political-economic structure, a contributing factor 
of further grievances of the Cuban revolutionaries. Many American companies held 
valuable, productive properties in Cuba, and when the Cuban government attempted to 
nationalize or control them, the United States intervened to prevent Cuba’s own self-
determination, notes Williams.173 Using the same hegemonic, unilateral Cold War 
decision-making to contain China’s rise in South America would likely lead to similar 
negative results.  
Although Vice President Pence and Secretary of State Tillerson have traveled to 
South America during the first year of President Trump’s administration, their rhetoric has 
not resonated well with the Latin American population as a whole. For example, Tillerson 
said, “strong institutions and accountable governments are needed to secure sovereignty 
against ‘potential predatory actors’ arriving in their region.”174 Although this is arguably 
an accurate statement of Chinese policy, much of the time many South Americans also 
view the United States as a predatory actor. Because U.S. relations with Mexico are 
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currently quite cold, it is better for the United States to remain silent and let South 
Americans plot their own course and be their own judges of the Chinese alternative until 
the United States can resolve issues with its closest neighbor. The United States either 
needs both feet in Latin America or both feet out. The latter, however, seems more 
promising. 
2. Active Role 
Although the China boom has slowed due to Chinese growth rates cooling from 
nearly 10% to around 7%, it does not appear that the economic trends for trade and 
investment between China and South America will change much. He Lifeng, chairman of 
the National Development and Reform Commission, stated to the People’s Republic of 
China’s congress held in October 2017, “We expect to achieve the full-year growth target 
of about 6.5 percent.”175 China has proven to be rather resilient and able to meet the goals 
it develops in its Five Year Plans, which means that the United States needs to start thinking 
more strategically if there is any chance of regaining any of the market share and political 
foothold lost in the region. Secretary of Defense Mattis stated as much in the National 
Defense Strategy: “Foster a competitive mindset. To succeed in the emerging security 
environment, our Department and Joint Force will have to out-think, out-maneuver, out-
partner, and out-innovate revisionist powers, rogue regimes, terrorists, and other threat 
actors.”176 
Although U.S. intervention in Latin America has tarnished the nation’s reputation, 
the United States should work multilaterally and aggressively with the nations of South 
America to help confront their challenges. The American Academy of Arts and Sciences 
noted in 2014, “If our nation does not act quickly to shore up its scientific enterprise, it will 
squander the advantage it has long held as engine of innovation that generates new 
discoveries and stimulates job growth.”177 Not only is South America in danger of 
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sacrificing technological advancement for increased dependency on raw material trade, but 
the United States, too, is losing to China its technological and manufacturing edge. 
It would behoove the United States to begin working with the members of the 
Organization of American States (OAS) to negotiate with individual countries to put 
pressure on China to help mend democratic erosion in Venezuela to which China has 
partially contributed. If China is unwilling to accept any responsibility or decry Maduro’s 
actions, the United States may need to shine a bright light of condemnation on these 
disruptive Chinese tactics across the Western Hemisphere. Ferchen states that Argentina, 
Brazil, and Chile have already expressed concern about President Maduro’s intentions to 
change the constitution.178 With so many large and powerful South American countries on 
the same page as the United States, the time is ripe to unite with South America to put 
pressure on China to assist in fixing the Venezuela mess—or the United States and South 
American allies should rekindle ties to rewind all that has been undone due to Chinese 
financing. 
However, to effectively push back against China in the region, the United States 
needs to create a better image of itself. Leveraging the voice of the Venezuelan opposition 
and allowing it to echo across South America is paramount. The Gallup Poll determined 
that 37% of Venezuelans approve of the job that President Trump is doing—the highest 
approval rating in Latin America—much higher than the 16% average across the rest of 
Latin America.179 The Venezuelan figure is encouraging, because it suggests that these 
citizens see hope in the Trump administration’s hard stance against the regime of President 
Maduro and still look to the United States as “a shiny city upon a hill” despite many 
frustrations. The United States needs to come together with the Venezuelan opposition and 
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the signatory countries of the Lima Declaration, who all demand that Maduro undo the 
abusive changes he has made to the institutions of Venezuela.180 
The signatory countries of the Lima Declaration are Argentina, Brazil, Canada, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru. 
As Francisco Monaldi states, “We want hemispheric efforts that are not perceived as a 
USA-Venezuela confrontation, as President Maduro has always tried to portray it. It’s very 
important that some very significant countries in the region have taken the lead.”181 The 
agreement about Venezuela provides further opportunities for the United States to mend 
relationships, because the region can see that some important decisions are not being 
influenced directly by the United States and that the regional voices matter. This kind of 
alignment does not weaken the United States but rather strengthens the hemisphere. 
If the United States can unite with powerful leaders of South America to accomplish 
unified goals for resolving the Venezuela crisis, new-found alliances can be built. Western 
Hemisphere alliances need to press China to start supporting democratic processes in the 
Western Hemisphere instead of allowing them to crumble and then claim that Chinese 
policy amounts to “non-intervention.” The United States should portray these negative 
underpinnings, largely perpetuated by China’s unwillingness to stand-up for the welfare of 
the Venezuelan citizens as they have been deprived of their political rights. 
In addition to working with Latin American partners to pressure Venezuela, the 
United States could implement a program similar to President Barrack Obama’s “Power 
Africa” initiative, which began in 2014 when he invited to the White House for talks all 
but four African heads of state. The program included a $14 billion investment for building 
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electrical infrastructure in the interior of Africa, according to Doyle McManus.182 The 
meeting was held to counter China’s growing influence in Africa and the meeting came at 
a perfect time, as an African-American president was in office to leverage American 
influence in the African region. One official mentioned, “these projects are a way we can 
compete with the Chinese for influence. We need to be on the playing field, even if we 
don’t play the same way.”183 
The challenges are likely more difficult in Africa because it is much further from 
the United States, there are more language barriers, and its culture are even more diverse 
than the U.S.-Latin American spread. There are many more authoritarian leaders in Africa 
who find it much easier to cut deals with China than adhering to U.S. requirements to 
promote human rights and transparency. Therefore, it should be much easier to develop a 
“Power America” initiative. Although electricity infrastructure is not needed as badly in 
South America as it is in most of Africa, many roads, highways, railways, and ports need 
to be built in South America. For example, Argentina has long sought a railway 
modernization loan. A “Power America” initiative would not necessarily be limited to 
electric grid projects; such an effort could provide technical assistance, infrastructure 
development, and innovative technologies to select South American countries. The 
recipient countries should meet predetermined transparency, human rights, counter-
narcotic, and gang and violence levels--or show efforts in curtailing the issues and meeting 
milestones along the way, in exchange for continued assistance. The U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and/or the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) 
could spearhead the program along with possible partnerships with nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs). 
Given the Trump administration’s hardline stance on protectionism, these 
initiatives would initially be heavily scrutinized, vigorously attacked, and ultimately 
subjected to fierce negotiating. Nonetheless, the initiatives would be in the best interests of 
                                                 





the entire Western Hemisphere, especially if promoted as a means to address the Western 
Hemisphere’s immigration, human trafficking, and drug trafficking issues. The efforts 
would likely create more jobs and stability in Latin America, which would help reduce 
immigration issues and potentially keep more people out of gangs and drug trade by having 
more alternatives within their own country of origin.  
Such a program would not only mitigate Chinese influence in South America but 
boost the United States’ tarnished image with its southern neighbors. “You don’t promote 
the cause of peace by talking only to the people with whom you agree,” President Dwight 
Eisenhower once said. “That is merely yes-man performance. You have got to meet face 
to face the people with whom you disagree at times, to determine whether or not there is a 
way of working out the differences and reaching a better understanding.”184  
Finally, the World Bank and IMF may need to increase loan limits for countries 
that meet benchmarks for combating drugs, gangs, and other corruptive activities. There 
needs to be more dialogue and cooperation between USAID, MCC, the World Bank, and 
IMF to pool resources for higher levels of funding. The cross-talk would likely facilitate 
more cooperation and knowledge sharing to effectively reach desired outcomes and give a 
new name to the World Bank as a leading financial institution in the region, instead of 
being undermined by the CDB. There are always opportunities for loaning money but loans 
need to directly benefit Latin America and the United States. Investing in manufacturing 
would likely lead to the best results as Latin America needs the domestic jobs and China 
is not bringing this option to the table.  
The World Bank and other institutions also need to work more closely with both 
large corporations within Latin America as well as those in the United States. China’s 
government is set up in such a way that its loans attach to its companies. When China says, 
“Move,” the state-owned enterprises largely enact what the leadership wants. The United 
States does not have the same mechanism, but the U.S. government can better direct 
funding to the World Bank, USAID, MCC, and others to ensure it is utilized more 
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effectively to fulfill the intent of the National Defense Strategy. Additionally, unlike China, 
the United States does not have state-owned enterprises to mobilize in South America. 
However, the U.S. government can incentivize U.S. companies to head projects in these 
regions. Government incentives could be reformed to provide U.S. private businesses—
theoretically more efficient than Chinese state-owned enterprises—with more 
opportunities to invest in what otherwise might be daunting South American projects by 
partnering with the World Bank, IMF, MCC, USAID, and others. 
Gallagher claims that Chinese and western banks have complemented each other; 
western banks tend to fund short-term, lower cost governmental and social programs, and 
Chinese banks try to fill the gap by providing what the West will not, such as massive 
infrastructure projects.185 It may be time for the United States to become more competitive 
with Chinese banks and businesses carrying out very large projects. It has been done 
before. A prime example is President Theodore Roosevelt’s vision to build the Panama 
Canal, from which Panama has benefited for over a century. Future projects can easily be 
polled by South American countries to find out what citizens want and see how both parties 
can benefit by pulling together resources. America needs to be bold again in the way it 
thinks and acts, and opportunities abound for building ties in the Western Hemisphere. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Mead stated, “World power does not come with a guarantee. Great powers rise and 
fall. New technologies, new weapons, and new ideologies have repeatedly overturned 
existing orders, bringing small peoples out of obscurity into empire and sending great 
empires crashing down into ruins.”186 It is not too late, however, to take action. This year 
the Group of Twenty (G20) summit will take place in Buenos Aires and the Group of Seven 
(G7) summit will take place in Charlevoix, Québec. Secretary of State Tillerson claimed, 
“in this year of the Americas, the U.S. will continue to be the Western Hemisphere’s 
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steadiest, strongest and most-enduring partner.”187 The Trump administration needs to take 
advantage of both summits by bringing proposals for South American projects, with a key 
emphasis on South America to ensure that the region’s leaders can provide their inputs and 
create mutually beneficial projects.  
Just as Vice President Pence stated during his southern tour to Colombia, 
Argentina, Chile, and Panama in August 2017, “‘America first’ does not mean ‘America 
alone.’”188 If the administration is serious about making America great again, it is 
imperative that the United States not work alone over the next three years—as well as 
during other U.S. administrations in the years to come. Domestic manufacturing can be a 
priority, which would help the United States promote and help facilitate South American 
projects, just as President Obama’s “Power Africa” is marching onward behind the scenes. 
There is no reason why a “Power America” project cannot help secure our own hemisphere. 
China will definitely bring money to the table with projects in mind. The United 
States needs to rethink how it provides financing to make its offers more enticing—an 
attractive, beneficial alternative to China’s “Commodity Consensus” that has prevailed 
over the past 15 years. Government organizations working abroad need to link funding and 
common goals to help combat China’s deindustrialization of South America. It is 
imperative that the United States use every opportunity to regain its hemispheric leadership 
and preclude China’s further distancing the region from U.S. influence. 
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